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Is Your Client Prejudiced? Litigating
Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims in
Immigration Matters Arising
in the Eleventh Circuit
MICHAEL S. VASTINE*
Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it
visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right
to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is
a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted. Meticu-
lous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is
deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.
-Justice William 0. Douglas'
The process of adjudicating asylum claims in the United States
entails a graduated system of hearings. The first opportunity to present a
case is before an asylum officer-a civil official-who conducts an
interview with minimal participation by the applicant's attorney. If
unsuccessful, the applicant renews the application defensively in
removal proceedings before an immigration judge-an administrative
official within the Department of Justice. The hearing is an adversarial
setting where the attorney for the applicant advocates against an attorney
from the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Chief Counsel.
Counsel is generally necessary to present an effective case before the
immigration court and on any appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
The U.S. system represents the necessary tension between the guid-
ing principles of refugee law, known as nonrefoulement,2 and the rigor-
ous examination by officers, judges, and counsel striving to ensure that
the applicants satisfy requirements of credibility, corroboration, and a
sufficient legal theory that mandates relief.
It is axiomatic that an asylum applicant has no experience in navi-
gating the complexities of this system. Consequently, the applicant is
* Director of the Immigration Clinic, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami
Gardens, Florida.
1. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
2. This term is defined as "[a] refugee's right not to be expelled from one state to another,
esp. to one where his or her life or liberty would be threatened." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1083
(8th ed. 2004).
3. See Judge Robert A. Katzmann, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Address at
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overmatched when litigating pro se against the trained counsel repre-
senting the United States. The immigration courts do not have the
authority to designate pro bono counsel for noncitizen respondents in
their administrative proceedings. The consequence is that the asylum-
seeking community is highly dependent on a private bar that varies in
skill level, familiarity with the asylum process, and commitment to its
clients. Immigration case law requires applicants to meet strict stan-
dards of proof in corroborating their claims. A central problem is
whether counsel for these respondents has an equally high burden of
effective advocacy or, at a minimum, a burden of informing the clients
of their evidentiary obligations.
This article will deal with the representation of clients in their
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and assess the role of the
Board of Immigration Appeals and the U.S. courts of appeals in ensur-
ing that immigrants are afforded a fair hearing in their removal proceed-
ings. The Board of Immigration Appeals has a long-established, three-
pronged approach for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Matter of Lozada, requiring the applicant to enter a sworn affida-
vit alleging counsel's responsibilities and their failure to fulfill these
obligations, inform the counsel of the charge and permit them to
respond, and report any ethical or professional violation to the relevant
state bar disciplinary panel. In order to win a new hearing, the immi-
grant must also show that the defective performance of counsel nega-
tively influenced the outcome of the case.4
The Eleventh Circuit has favorably viewed this requirement of
demonstrating prejudice. Thus, before the Eleventh Circuit, pursuant to
Dakane v. U.S. Attorney General, the applicant must show that the per-
formance of counsel was so inadequate that there is a reasonable possi-
bility that, but for the attorney's error, the outcome of the proceedings
would be different.' Dakane itself involves an attorney that failed to file
a required brief and thus deprived a Somali asylum applicant of his right
to appeal. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the petition for review because
the immigration judge had found Dakane's testimony not credible.6 The
court reasoned that the attorney's failure on appeal did not prejudice
the Orison S. Marden Lecture of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York: The Legal
Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor 5 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://
www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/katzmann-immigration-speech.pdf ("Numbers alone
cannot capture the human drama on display in the immigration process. All immigrants, whether
or not refugees or asylum seekers, are largely strangers to our language, our culture, our laws,
certainly the complicated maze of immigration laws.").
4. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), affd sub nom. Lozada v.
INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988).
5. 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (lth Cir. 2005).
6. See id. at 1275.
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Dakane, as his own testimony was his undoing.7 The court did not
address the fact that with adequate performance of counsel, Dakane
might have contested and possibly reversed the negative credibility find-
ing; and that he was therefore likely subject to prejudice by his counsel's
negligence.
The court presently uses Dakane as the standard for reviewing
cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. As of May 2008,
Dakane has been cited almost 100 times by federal courts of appeals,
with most of the citations coming from the Eleventh Circuit.8 The Elev-
enth Circuit has yet to find prejudice under the Dakane standard.
Dakane was decided under the deferential "abuse of discretion"
standard that federal courts apply in cases arising within an administra-
tive agency's area of expertise. 9 However, the Board of Immigration
Appeals and the Department of Justice (the agency that is being ques-
tioned regarding its expertise), in issuing decisions in cases arising in the
Eleventh Circuit, rely on Dakane to reject cases for failing to demon-
strate the requirement of prejudice. The facts of these cases are often
further complicated by multiple layers of ineffective assistance and the
failure of counsel to preserve issues for appeal or to properly follow
established precedent or procedure.
This article will examine the seemingly disastrous results of cases
like Dakane in processing the cases of asylum seekers and other immi-
grants facing deportation. It will further explore bar complaints and
Lozada claims before the Department of Justice. The goal is to reveal
whether Dakane is itself problematic or if it is simply indicative of fail-
ures of advocates in representing asylum seekers and presenting other
defensive cases in removal proceedings.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
In removal proceedings, noncitizens may be represented by an
attorney or representative of their own choosing at no cost to the govern-
ment.10 This representation may be provided by attorneys, law students
and law graduates serving pro bono and with attorney supervision,
nonattorney-accredited representatives, and other reputable individu-
7. Id.
8. This number was calculated after conducting a Westlaw search. It will presumably
increase by the time this article is published and thereafter.
9. See id.; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (explaining that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer").
10. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b) (2008).
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als. 1 While lists of local, free, legal-service providers are given to all
respondents, the noncitizens generally must secure private counsel or
they must proceed pro se. In contrast, and as in the criminal trial, the
U.S. government is always represented by attorneys, in this context by
assistant chief counsel from the Department of Homeland Security.
In a well-known series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court evolved its
position regarding the necessity of counsel in criminal cases and the
essential role of effective representation to protect the rights of the
accused. While Gideon v. Wainwright is famously known for establish-
ing the right to counsel in criminal matters, as early as 1932 the Supreme
Court had declared that the right to the aid of counsel is of a fundamen-
tal character.
12
In Gideon, the Court reversed its prior decision in Betts v. Brady'3
and recognized that in the adversarial system of criminal justice, any
person summoned into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be
assured a fair trial without assistance of counsel.' 4 The Court reasoned
as follows:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums
of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.
Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best
lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That gov-
ernment hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitu-
tions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substan-
tive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendant's need
for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr.
Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
11. See id. § 1292.1.
12. 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932)).
13. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44.
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of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of coun-
sel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted
upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or oth-
erwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge ade-
quately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence."'
15
Clarence Earl Gideon had been accused of a felony for breaking
and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor.16
Despite the possibility of facing a lengthy prison sentence, the trial court
denied Gideon's request to appoint counsel for him on the ground that
under Florida law only a defendant charged with a capital offense was
entitled to such an appointment."7 Gideon challenged his conviction on
the ground that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the trial
court's refusal to appoint counsel.' 8
At the time of Gideon's conviction, the controlling Supreme Court
precedent was Betts v. Brady, and the Gideon Court interpreted Betts as
acknowledging that in some noncapital cases, a defendant may be able
to show "special circumstances" that would mandate court-appointed
representation. 9 However, the burden remained on the defendant to
show "special circumstances" to potentially establish a denial of due
process.2" With Gideon's victory, defendants became assured of court-
appointed representation whenever they faced the possibility of a sub-
stantial prison sentence.
A. Right to Effective Counsel: Strickland v. Washington
With the right to counsel assured, later cases sought to establish
when, and if, there is a minimum standard of performance required to
support a finding that a defendant received effective representation by
either court-appointed or privately retained attorneys. In Strickland v.
Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and that
the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adver-
15. Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
16. Id. at 336.
17. Id. at 337.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 350 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Id.
2008] 1067
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sarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.21 Strickland established a two-part analysis for determining
whether defendants are entitled to vacate their convictions. 22 First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.23  Sec-
ond, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.24
Regarding the first prong, the defendant must show a denial of
"reasonably effective assistance," considering all the circumstances,
meaning that the representation fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonableness. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential, and the Supreme Court directs that "a fair assessment
of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from coun-
sel's perspective at the time."'26 Furthermore, courts will presume that
"counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance. 27
The crimes at the heart of Strickland were gruesome and several. 28
21. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
22. Id. at 687. The Court held:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. In rejecting Strickland's claim of ineffective assistance, "the trial court concluded that
respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious
deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the
outcome of the sentencing proceeding." Id. at 677.
25. Id. at 687 (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)).
26. Id. at 669, 689.
27. Id. at 689.
28. Id. at 671-72. The Court described the crime spree:
During a 10-day period in September 1976, respondent planned and committed
three groups of crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, torture,
kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft.
After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police and
voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal episodes.
The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnapping and murder and appointed
an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
• . . [Counsel] cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense of
1068 [Vol. 62:1063
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Justice O'Connor's decision begins with a five-page account of the
crimes and the defendant's subsequent decisions preceding and during
his trial, including his confession to three murders. In sentencing Strick-
land, the trial judge found overwhelming aggravating factors and little to
no mitigating issues.29
The Court proceeded to detail its concept of "prejudice," issuing
the current standard that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come," given the totality of the evidence.30 As a matter of procedure, a
court does not need to assess both prongs of the analysis if it is possible
to dispose of the case for failing to make the requisite showing of
prejudice. The Court held that other reviewing courts are not bound to
follow a particular order, but may first "determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by
the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies," but "[i]f it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice," then the courts are permitted to do so.
31
The courts have determined that they must maintain a flexible
approach in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel to
make an adequate inquiry into the fundamental fairness of the proceed-
ing, which is being challenged. "In every case the court should be con-
cerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the
hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against his specific advice,
respondent had also confessed to the first two murders. By the date set for trial,
respondent was subject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and
multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking and entering and
assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Respondent waived
his right to a jury trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty to
all charges, including the three capital murder charges.
Id. at 671-72.
29. See id. at 675. The Court detailed the proceedings at trial:
The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances with respect to each of
the three murders. He found that all three murders were especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel, all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were
committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and
since all involved robbery, the murders were for pecuniary gain. All three murders
were committed to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder law
enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected
numerous persons to a grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the
murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe-in one case, ultimately
fatal-injuries.
Id. at 674.
30. Id. at 694.
31. Id. at 697.
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result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown
in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just
results. 32
The Strickland Court ruled that Strickland's counsel's conduct and
strategy were not unreasonable and the result of the hearing, in light of
the egregious facts, did not indicate that the proceedings were unfair.3 3
This was despite counsel's failure to develop psychological and charac-
ter evidence to present in the sentencing phase of the trial. The Court
further concluded that even if his counsel had failed in some way,
Strickland would be unable to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to war-
rant setting aside his death sentence.34  Specifically, the Court found:
[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates beyond
any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each of the ... things [that
respondent alleged counsel had failed to do] at the time of sentencing,
there is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have
been any different. The plain fact is that the aggravating circum-
stances proved in this case were completely overwhelming ... ..
32. Id. at 696.
33. See id. at 699.
34. Id. at 699-700. The Court went on at length:
The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other bases for the
ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out that a psychiatric examination of
respondent was conducted by state order soon after respondent's initial arraignment.
That report states that there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of
the crimes. Moreover, both the reports submitted in the collateral proceeding state
that, although respondent was "chronically frustrated and depressed because of his
economic dilemma," he was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance. All three reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from extreme mental or emotional
disturbance during his crime spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide
not to seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea colloquy to
support the emotional disturbance contention, counsel denied the State an
opportunity to rebut his claim with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the
aggravating circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice
resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence offered in the
collateral attack.
The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to develop and to present
character evidence for much the same reasons. The affidavits submitted in the
collateral proceeding showed nothing more than that certain persons would have
testified that respondent was basically a good person who was worried about his
family's financial problems. Respondent himself had already testified along those
lines at the plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course of stealing
rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affidavits. For those reasons, and
because the sentencing judge had stated that the death sentence would be
appropriate even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the character
evidence offered in the collateral attack.
Id. at 676-77.
35. Id. at 677-78 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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If there is only one plausible line of defense, counsel is required to
conduct a "reasonably substantial investigation" into that line of defense
because there can be no strategic choice that renders such an investiga-
tion unnecessary." This same duty exists if counsel relies at trial on
only one line of defense even though other defenses are available.
3 7 If
counsel conducts such "substantial investigations," into possible
defenses, the strategic choices that counsel may make as a result "will
seldom if ever" be found wanting.38 In the end, the adversary system
requires deference to counsel's informed decisions, and such strategic
choices must be respected in these circumstances as long as they are
based on professional judgment.39
Focusing on efficiency, the Court noted a concern of a possible
proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges if the process was not defer-
ential to reasoned judgment by trial counsel.4° The Court feared that a
less deferential system would lead to losing defendants increasingly fol-
lowing their actual trials with second trials-now focused on the inef-
fective nature of counsel's defense.4' Counsel's performance and even
counsel's willingness to serve could be adversely affected if subjected to
this continuing analysis. "Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid
requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and
impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance
of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and
client."4
Thus, any court deciding an ineffectiveness claim is restricted to
the specific facts and chronology of the particular case when it deter-
mines the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct.4 3 This
means that a convicted defendant making an ineffective-assistance claim
must identify those acts or omissions of counsel that were not the result
of reasonable professional judgment.4 "The court must then determine
36. See id. at 680.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 681.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 690, 697. The Court explained:
The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts
should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Id. at 697.
41. Id. at 690 ("Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
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whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omis-
sions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assis-
tance.""a In making that determination, Strickland advises that "the
court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in pre-
vailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process
work in the particular case. "46
The topic has rightly been highly contested since the Strickland
decision was issued, with some prosecutors seeing the ineffective claim
as a mechanism likely to be abused by the convicted.47 In fact, the
prejudice requirement is so rarely satisfied that some find that it stands
more for forbidding only the most egregiously ineffective behavior,
rather than requiring effectiveness.48
B. The Successful Ineffective-Assistance Challenge:
Wiggins v. Smith
In 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court did find ineffective assistance in
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See James Podgers, The Blame Game: Criminal Defendants Try To Reverse Convictions
by Claiming Ineffective Counsel, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 44.
Prosecutors, however, tend to view claims of ineffective representation more as
another element in the repertoire of tactics available to defendants seeking to
overturn convictions rather than a symptom of a crumbling network of effective
defense services.
"We hear so much about indigent representation falling below par, but I do not
believe that to be the case," asserts Michael P. Barnes, prosecuting attorney for St.
Joseph's County, Indiana.
Id.; see also Gary Hengstler, Attorneys for the Damned, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 56.
"Before I got involved with this, I used to think the death penalty was fairly
imposed," said Ronald Tabak, special counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and
Hom in New York. "After all, everything I had read suggested that it was the death
row inmates who were abusing the system through repeated frivolous appeals."
Id. This is also a common complaint among the assistant chief counsel who prosecute
immigration matters, some of whom remark that an immigration case is never over until the
immigrant wins.
48. See Douglas McCollam, The Ghost of Gideon, AM. LAW., Mar. 2003, at 64.
"Gideon is of immense symbolic importance," says Abe Krash, an Arnold &
Porter partner who worked with [future Supreme Court Justice Abe] Fortas on the
case, "but in practice there's a great gap between the promise and how it's been
realized." In part that's because courts have proven amazingly tolerant of shoddy
lawyering, like the 72-year-old lawyer in Texas who slept through much of his
client's capital murder case. Or the lawyer in California arrested for drunk driving
on the way to pick a jury in his client's murder trial. Or the lawyer in Georgia who
didn't make a single objection during his client's capital murder trial .... Yet in
none of the cases cited above was the lawyer's conduct deemed sufficiently bad to
require a reversal on appeal. "If Gideon just means having a warm body in court
sitting next to the defendant, we might as well not call it a constitutional guarantee,"
says Kathryn Jones of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
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Wiggins v. Smith, a challenge to a capital-sentencing case in which the
counsel was found to have deviated from practice standards during pre-
sentence investigation.4 9 Challenging the adequacy of his representation
at sentencing, Wiggins argued that his attorneys had rendered constitu-
tionally defective assistance because they failed to investigate and pre-
sent mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. To support
his claim, he presented testimony by a licensed social worker who was
certified as an expert by the court.50 The social worker's testimony was
exclusively for the sake of the appeal to show the available defense not
presented by Wiggins's counsel. The expert testified concerning an
elaborate social-history report he had prepared containing evidence of
the severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of
his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents. 5 Relying
on state social services, medical and school records, as well as inter-
views with Wiggins and numerous family members, the expert chroni-
cled Wiggins's horrific life history."
The Court found trial counsel's failing efforts in presenting the case
to reflect ineffectiveness, more than unsuccessful strategic choices. It
applied its discussion from Strickland:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strate-
gic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasona-
ble precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be
49. 539 U.S. 510, 533-34 (2003).
50. Id. at 516.
51. Id. at 516-17.
52. See id. The Court relayed the expert's testimony:
According to [the] report, petitioner's mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently
left Wiggins and his siblings home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and
to eat paint chips and garbage. Mrs. Wiggins' abusive behavior included beating
the children for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked. She had sex
with men while her children slept in the same bed and, on one occasion, forced
petitioner's hand against a hot stove burner-an incident that led to petitioner's
hospitalization. At the age of six, the State placed Wiggins in foster care.
Petitioner's first and second foster mothers abused him physically[ I and, as
petitioner explained to [the expert], the father in his second foster home repeatedly
molested and raped him. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and
began living on the streets. He returned intermittently to additional foster homes,
including one in which the foster mother's sons allegedly gang-raped him on more
than one occasion. After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job
Corps program and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor.
Id. (citations omitted).
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directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, apply-
ing a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.53
The record showed that Wiggins's counsel's diligence was below the
standard level of practice, which at the time of Wiggins's trial included
the preparation of a social-history report:
Despite the fact that the Public Defender's office made funds availa-
ble for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to
commission such a report. Counsel's conduct similarly fell short of
the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American
Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have referred
as "guides to determining what is reasonable." The ABA Guidelines
provide that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise
efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced
by the prosecutor." Despite these well-defined norms, however,
counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's background
after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history
from a narrow set of sources.5 4
With "ineffectiveness" established by counsel's break from accepted
professional norms, Wiggins still needed to show prejudice. Unlike in
Strickland-where the Court gave much attention to the scope of the
defendant's crimes and found their numerosity and aggravating factors
so overwhelming that it was unlikely that mitigating factors could have
helped Mr. Strickland avoid the death sentence-the Wiggins Court
focused on the compelling personal story of the defendant: "Wiggins'
sentencing jury heard only one significant mitigating factor-that Wig-
gins had no prior convictions. Had the jury been able to place peti-
tioner's excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there
is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a
different balance."55 Since a single juror could have saved Wiggins
from the death penalty, it was deemed that prejudice was shown, as the
outcome would have been different if the evidence had been properly
developed and presented by effective counsel.
Although Wiggins was successful, the case represents the excep-
tion, rather than the norm, in challenges based on ineffective assistance,
as evidenced by the fact that Wiggins was only the second death-penalty
reversal by the Supreme Court after Strickland, with the first reversal,
Williams v. Taylor,56 being decided in 2000, sixteen years after Strick-
53. Id. at 521-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 524 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 537.
56. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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land. Strickland's two-pronged approach is extremely limiting, such
that one must question what substantive protections result from the
noble intentions of Gideon.57 In fact, despite surveys showing that the
federal bench found the defense bar to be grossly inadequate, a survey of
cases from the first four years after Strickland was decided revealed that
in all federal courts, cause for reversal under the two-pronged approach
was found in only 4% of cases.58
II. DUE-PROCESS CONCERNS AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
As discussed above, there is no right to appointed counsel in immi-
gration proceedings. Arguments have been made for providing repre-
sentation to all immigrants, but at the present those without means to
57. See Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How To Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 455-56
(1988).
Replacing the amorphous and virtually insurmountable Strickland standard
with [a] predictable and objective categorical approach will provide defense
counsel, lower courts, and defendants much-needed guidance on how to vindicate
the sixth amendment fight to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland's prejudice
prong is in large measure responsible for transforming a standard meant to protect
the basic constitutional fight to effective assistance of counsel into the proverbial
"eye of the needle" through which few defendants are able to pass. 43.3% of all the
unsuccessful ineffective assistance claims brought under Strickland have been
rejected solely for lack of prejudice. Rather than repeatedly paying cynical lip
service to the fundamental constitutional importance of the fight to effective
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court should abolish the prejudice requirement
for most cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 430-31.
Three different kinds of information indicate that the overall quality of defense
counsel performance is inadequate and that Strickland was built on a shaky
foundation. First, [a survey of] all ineffective assistance claims reviewed by federal
circuit courts between the time of the Strickland decision and May 1988, shows that
the circuit courts explicitly found that counsel's performance did not fall outside of
the wide range of reasonable professional conduct in only 54.3% of all ineffective
assistance claims. Conversely, only 4.3% of all ineffectiveness claims resulted in
reversals. Of the remaining claims resolved only by a finding of no prejudice, the
court indicated that defense counsel's performance was inadequate in 5.3% of the
total claims even though the conviction was affirmed. Thus, even when evaluated
under Strickland's excessively deferential performance prong-with the "easy way
out" provided by the prejudice prong-counsel's performance was unreasonable at
least 4.3% of the time, and upon closer scrutiny of the courts' opinions that figure
approaches ten percent. If Strickland were not so deferential to defense counsel's
performance and did not encourage lower courts to avoid the question of inadequate
representation by making solely a prejudice determination, courts undoubtedly
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retain private counsel must either proceed pro se or, in some fortunate
circumstances, with the aid of an attorney, with a nonprofit organization,
or law-school clinic providing services free of charge.59 Unfortunately,
immigrants, particularly asylum seekers, are frequently poor, and their
access to quality representation is correspondingly minimized.
Although there are many quality attorneys specializing in immigration-
defense work, there is ample anecdotal and empirical evidence that a
great deal of inadequate, if not illegal, representation is carried out by
attorneys and nonattorneys throughout the country.6 ° Concerns over
quality of representation led the Department of Justice, Executive Office
for Immigration Review to issue its own rules for disciplining
practitioners:
While most practitioners adequately represent their clients in immi-
gration matters, a small minority of practitioners do not meet the min-
imum standards set forth in this rule and an even smaller minority
may take unfair advantage of the very clients they have promised to
help. Others have engaged in conduct that has rendered them unfit to
practice law, as determined by the state courts which originally
licensed them to practice. The practitioners who should not, and in
fact cannot, be permitted to continue to practice before EOIR and the
Service are the practitioners who will primarily be affected by this
59. See Katzmann, supra note 3, at 7-13. Katzmann notes:
In 1999, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan proposed a mandated counsel pilot
project in three Immigration and Naturalization Service districts, arguing that
asylum seekers should have the right to representation in removal provisions and
that such provisions would be cost effective by obviating the need for frequent
continuances for asylum seekers who search for pro bono legal support. Senator
Diane Feinstein proposed legislation mandating legal representation for
unaccompanied children in immigration proceedings, reasoning that youngsters
should not be expected to navigate the immigration process.
Id. (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 4-6. Katzman states:
I might also say, from sitting on an appellate court, that the quality of
representation varies widely. There are, of course, many lawyers in the immigration
bar who serve their clients well, who submit briefs which reflect considerable
thinking; they deserve our praise and appreciation. But too many of the briefs
which I see are barely competent, often boilerplate submissions. John Palmer, a
superb staff attorney with the Second Circuit, undertook a study with coauthors
Stephen Yale-Loehr and Elizabeth Cronin, and determined that ten law offices
(most with just one attorney) had 34.87 of the petitions for review pending in the
Second Circuit on April 21, 2005, and that the total for top 20 offices was 46.54.
What is particularly striking is that several of these solo practitioners each had more
than 100 cases pending for review. From my vantage point, one cannot help but
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rule.6 '
A critical procedural safeguard, the right to effective counsel ensures
that our advocacy system will achieve its "ultimate goal of affording
people a fair trial, and allowing the truth to surface. 6 2 But unscrupu-
lous attorneys may clog the legal system and cause problems by coach-
ing their clients to lie, filing false claims on their behalf, and filing
frivolous appeals.63
Quality representation is essential to succeed in immigration cases.
The difference in the approval rates in asylum cases is astounding-
those represented by counsel are much more likely to prevail than those
who appear pro se.6 Immigration cases tend to be very fact-intensive.65
In the asylum context, respondents are charged with a high burden of
proof and strict corroboration requirements. 66 They are expected to pro-
vide any and all documentation to support central and collateral ele-
ments of their claims, or alternatively argue its reasonable
unavailability.67 In the context of defensive waivers of criminal grounds
of removal, case law has established a framework of factors that the
applicants must satisfy, with direct documentation of their life in the
United States and the prospective effects of their removal on their fami-
lies and communities. 68  In both contexts, immigrants must be thor-
61. Professional Conduct for Practitioners-Rules and Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,513,
39,514-15 (June 27, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 292).
62. The Honorable Carlos T. Bea, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Address to the
Board of Immigration Appeals and Immigration Judges (Aug. 10, 2007), in 12 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 1357, 1361 (2007).
63. Id.
64. TRAC Immigration, Immigration Judges, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 (last
visited June 5, 2008) ("The data indicate that an important determining factor in the decision
process is the presence or absence of legal representation. While having a lawyer by no means
ensures success-64% of these requests are denied-the denial rate for those without it is far
higher, 93%.") [hereinafter TRAC, Immigration Judges].
65. Katzmann, supra note 3, at 6. Katzmann observes:
Proceedings before the immigration judge are fact-intensive. An immigrant
often has limited fluency with the English language, and the immigration judge
must work with a translator in the effort to understand the immigrant's case;
frequently, because of the language difficulty, the judge must ask the immigrant the
same question repeatedly in order to be secure about his or her complete answer.
An immigrant who appears pro se or does not have the benefit of adequate counsel
will be at a disadvantage in such proceedings.
Id.
66. See In re S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1997) (noting that while a respondent
may be able, in some cases, to establish their claim through credible testimony alone, available
supporting documentation must be submitted or its absence explained).
67. See id.
68. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584-85 (B.I.A. 1978); As another court
explained:
[F]avorable considerations include such factors as family ties within the United
States, residence of long duration in this country .... evidence of hardship to the
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oughly prepared to present their testimony, as their credibility is central
to their claims.69
Recently, the dramatic inconsistency in asylum-grant rates between
immigration judges has sparked controversy.70 For example, within the
Miami Immigration Court, immigration judges' denial rates of asylum
claims range from 22.3% to 96.7%. 7' In New York, two judges denied
asylum requests less than 11% of the time and four denied requests more
than 90% of the time.
72
Nationally, the judge-to-judge differences in asylum rates for appli-
cants from single countries is remarkable. Chinese applicants range
from a denial rate of 7% up to a denial rate of 95%.73 Even within a
single court there is dramatic variation. The denial rate of asylum cases
for judges in Los Angeles varied from 27% to 87%.7' Nationally, judge-
to-judge denial rates for Haitians ranged between 16% and 99%.75
Judge-to-judge asylum denial rates for Colombians were as low as 2%
and as high as 96%, including a Miami range of denial rates from 16%
respondent and his family if deportation occurs, service in this country's armed
forces, a history of employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence
of value or service to the community, proof of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal
record exists and other evidence attesting to a respondent's good character. Among
the factors deemed adverse to an alien are the nature and underlying circumstances
of the grounds of exclusion or deportation (now removal) that are at issue, the
presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the
existence of a criminal record and, . . . other evidence indicative of a respondent's
bad character or undesirability ....
In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec at
584-85).
69. Katzmann, supra note 3, at 4. Katzmann expounds:
Thus, quality legal representation in gathering and presenting evidence in a hearing
context and the skill in advocacy as to any legal issues and their preservation for
appeal can make all the difference between the right to remain here and being
deported. It also means that getting effective counseling BEFORE, not after,
petitioning for relief or getting immersed in proceedings provides the best chance
for fleshing out the merits of the case, avoiding false or prejudicial filings, and
securing lawful status or appropriate relief.
Id.
70. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC") has compiled and
maintained exhaustive data on this subject. See TRAC, Immigration Judges, supra note 64; see
also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007).
71. See TRAC, Immigration Judges, supra note 64 (referring to charts included in figure 4
listing percentages of denials for different judges and asylum seekers of different nationalities).
72. Id.
73. TRAC Immigration, Asylum Disparities Persist, Regardless of Court Location and





to 97%.76 The conclusion of TRAC was that the wide range of dispari-
ties in how asylum matters are decided-regardless of the perspective
from which they are examined-points strongly to a "dysfunctional sys-
tem where the law is not the law."7 7
In any legal context, lawyers and their clients must strive to
develop a complete record before the initial fact finder. In the immigra-
tion context, this is of paramount importance, not only to secure victory
at the onset of the case, but to prepare for inevitable appeals. What is
filed and what is said have enduring effects. Immigration judges will
often make findings of adverse credibility based on the disparity
between the two.
Despite (or perhaps because of) the vulnerability of many immigra-
tion clients, there are many instances of attorneys who accept and liti-
gate cases without taking the necessary time to fully develop the factual,
cultural, and legal issues present. This practice style dooms the immi-
grant both at the trial and appellate levels.78
What record is made by the immigrant, therefore, and what legal
points are preserved for review in the record are critical to the out-
come, especially where the alien has the burden of coming forward
with evidence and the burden of proof of entitlement to status or
relief. Even if a[n] [appellate] judge would have ruled differently in
the first instance, he or she has no authority to do SO.
79
As Judge Katzmann described:
Especially for those fleeing from persecution, however, their first
encounters with immigration authorities may be difficult. Experience
has led them to be distrustful and fearful of government. Having
lived life in the shadows in their native lands, they enter this country
afraid and often are easy prey for unscrupulous parties. Not knowing
where to turn, anecdotal evidence suggests that they often depend on
notarios and travel agents-persons who generally share the language
and culture-for advice as to how to secure legal entry. And anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that not all notarios and travel agents are com-
76. TRAC Immigration, Court-by-Court Disparity in Asylum Decisions, http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/183/include/2_citydisparity.html (last visited June 5, 2008).
77. Id.
78. Katzmann, supra note 3, at 5. Katzmann expounds:
Often times, the reviewing appellate judge, who is constrained at the time the case
comes before her, is left with the feeling that if only the immigrant had secured
adequate representation at the outset, the outcome might have been different. For the
immigrant who is ultimately deported, the consequences of faulty representation are
devastating. Unlike a person in the U.S. who can sue a lawyer for malpractice, or
file a bar complaint, a deported immigrant for financial, geographic or other
reasons, is unlikely to pursue such recourse.
79. Id. at 4.
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petent or honest; travel agents often refer the immigrants to persons
with whom they have relationships, but who are not licensed to prac-
tice law. These unauthorized practitioners, sometimes known, mis-
leadingly as "notarios," charge immigrants for their services in filing
documents and preparing applicants for relief and benefits, but often
lead the immigrants astray with incorrect information and terrible
advice with lasting, damaging consequences that can fatally prejudice
what otherwise would be a proper claim to entry. The immigrants are
also referred to licensed lawyers, too many of whom render inade-
quate and incompetent service. These attorneys do not even meet
with their clients to flush out all the relevant facts and supporting
evidence or prepare them for their hearings; these are "stall" lawyers
who hover around the immigrant community, taking dollars from vul-
nerable people with meager resources. They undermine trust in the
American legal system, with damaging consequences for the immi-
grants' lives.8°
Judge Bea is a bit more blunt:
Although the immigration bar certainly has some of the best and
most dedicated attorneys, it is also an area that attracts some of the
worst. First, the clients tend to be uninformed about how the Ameri-
can justice system operates. They have few connections with busi-
ness and community leaders who can inform them. They
unquestioningly accept whatever the attorney tells them. Second, if
malpractice is committed, the likely result is the client is removed
and no malpractice suit is ever filed.
Therefore, we must be especially vigilant about policing the
immigration bar. 8
III. DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE STATE BARS AND
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the
public. Lawyers who have engaged in serious misconduct, such as theft
of client funds or certain crimes, may be suspended or disbarred. Other
types of misconduct, such as not communicating with clients or failing
to pursue a case diligently, may result in an admonishment or reprimand,
or the attorney being placed in a diversion or probation program. 2 Lack
of competence and lack of diligence may result in punishment ranging
from an admonishment to disbarment, depending on the severity of the
80. Id. at 5.
81. The Honorable Carlos T. Bea, supra note 62, at 1361.
82. See generally The Florida Bar, Consumer Pamphlet: Inquiry Concerning a Florida
Lawyer, http://www.floridabar.org/tfbfrFBConsum.nsf/48e76203493b82ad852567O9007Oc9b9/c5




For example, in 2006 there were 72,695 attorneys with active
licenses to practice in Florida.84 Of the 9063 complaints of lawyer mis-
conduct that were filed, only 557 lawyers were charged.85 In Georgia,
during 2005 there were 28,689 attorneys.86 There were 2500 complaints
filed against the attorneys.87 Of these complaints, 356 were investigated
and 112 were dismissed, resulting in 123 different attorneys charged for
the remaining 244 proven allegations.88 Two-thousand-thirty-nine were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.8 9
One example of Florida attorney discipline for conduct in the immi-
gration context, Florida Bar v. Alvarez, involved a lawyer who handled
a high volume of matters before the immigration court. 9° Alvarez
worked in conjunction with a religious organization that referred him
cases that he represented at "reduced fee[s]." 9' In the ten complaints
consolidated into a legal action against him, it was apparent that he was
only able to maintain the pace of his high-volume practice by failing to
prepare adequately each case or meet with the clients in advance of hear-
ings. As found by the referee making findings on behalf of the Florida
Supreme Court:
4) Respondent's first contact with the [clients] occurred on October
19, 1999, prior to their Master Calendar Hearing.
5) Respondent agreed to appear with the [clients] at their Master Cal-
endar Hearing and received a fee from [them] for this appearance.
6) On October 19, 1999, Respondent appeared with [them] at the
Master Calendar Hearing during which the Individual Hearing on
[their] asylum applications was scheduled for January 10, 2000.
8) Respondent's next contact with the [clients] occurred on January
83. See A.B.A. JOINT COM. OF PROF'L SANCTIONS, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS §§ 4.4, 4.5 (1992).
84. ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/06-chl.pdf. The Florida Bar does
not maintain data on the nature of the practices of the disciplined attorneys so it is not possible to
know the number of complaints or orders of discipline issued to immigration practitioners.
85. Id.
86. ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS




90. No. SC06-940, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1217 (Fla. June 21, 2007). The details of the case are
laid out in more depth in the referee's report. See Fla. Bar v. Alvarez, Case No. SC06-940 (Fla.
June 21, 2007) (Rep. of Ref.), available at www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2006/801-
1000/06-940_ROR.pdf.
91. See Alvarez, Case No. SC06-940, at *3.
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10, 2000. On that date Respondent met with [them], prior to their
Individual Hearing, and then proceeded to represent [them] at their
Individual Hearing.
9) The [clients'] request for asylum was denied during the Individual
Hearing; Respondent acknowledges that the [clients] believe asylum
was denied due to inadequate preparation by Respondent.9 2
The referee made further findings that, in other matters, Alvarez contrib-
uted to the failure of his clients' cases because he missed appeal dead-
lines by filing incorrect addresses with the court, caused clients to miss
hearings by sending notices to incorrect addresses, failed to communi-
cate with his clients to properly develop their cases, caused a client to
abandon a possible form of relief by not filing an application in a timely
manner, and failed to submit necessary corroborating documentation in
accordance with an established court deadline.9 3 Despite this extreme
negligence, Alvarez received just a ninety-day suspension and a fine of
$2,251.90.
94
State bars are not alone in instituting discipline. On occasion, a
federal court sees fit to sanction members of its bar. For example, an
immigration practitioner received a sixty-day suspension after the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit referred his conduct to the
Florida Bar.95 The referee in the matter found the following:
[O]f 85 petitions filed by Mr. Jean-Joseph after 1 January 2001, 43
were dismissed for want of prosecution or failure to file timely
notices of appeal. Mr. Jean-Joseph filed 26 motions to reinstate, of
which 16 were granted and 10 were denied. The Eleventh Circuit's
Final Disciplinary Order further found that the Respondent failed to
appropriately supervise the activities of his associates who actually
prepared the briefs, but were not admitted to practice before the
Court. The Order sanctioned the Respondent as follows:
A. Respondent [was] suspended from the practice of law in the
immigration courts for 3 months;
B. Respondent [was] publicly reprimanded and admonished;
C. Respondent [was required] to comply with The Florida Bar's
Law Office Management course;
92. Id. at *4.
93. See id. at *6-16.
94. Alvarez, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1217, at *1, *2. Alvarez was also ordered to attend and
successfully complete ethics school. Id. at *1.
95. See Fla. Bar v. Jean-Joseph, 952 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2007). Again, the details of the case,
including information about the Eleventh Circuit's order, are laid out in more depth in the
referee's report. See Fla. Bar v. Jean-Joseph, Case No. SC06-1649 (Fla. Feb. 15, 2007) (Rep. of
Ref.), available at www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/briefs/2006/1601-1800/06-1649-ROR.pdf.
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D. Respondent [was] required to attend 2004 Immigration Con-
ference; and
E. Respondent [was] required to pay costs of disciplinary
proceedings.96
In each of the examples above, the conduct of the attorneys was
detrimental to the development of the clients' cases at trial or to the
presentation of issues on appeal. In some cases, the clients were both
prevented from building an adequate record and from appealing the legal
findings for their removal due to negligence of the same attorney. This
phenomenon seems to highlight Justice Marshall's concerns about prop-
erly identifying cases when ineffective assistance attaches to a case, par-
ticularly at the appellate level, because that it is impossible to identify if
flaws in a record are the result of a weak case or if it simply reflects the
inadequacy of the attorney who was ineffective in developing the case. 97
IV. INEFFECTIVENESS IN IMMIGRATION LITIGATION
A. Board of Immigration Appeals: Lozada and its Application
The primary controlling case from the Board of Immigration
Appeals is Matter of Lozada.98 Lozada largely parallels the principles
from Strickland and Wiggins regarding the necessity of demonstrating
both ineffective assistance and prejudice for the immigrant-respondent
to prevail in seeking a rehearing of the case.99 But Lozada also went a
step further than these other cases by creating additional procedural
requirements, specific to the immigration context, for establishing an
ineffective case prior to presenting the matter to the courts for review. 00
Lozada concerned a resident alien who was subject to deportation
proceedings because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral
96. Jean-Joseph, Case No. SC06-1649, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently
to ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer. The
difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility
that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely
because of the incompetence of defense counsel. In view of all these impediments
to a fair evaluation of the probability that the outcome of a trial was affected by
ineffectiveness of counsel, it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose
lawyer has been shown to have been incompetent the burden of demonstrating
prejudice.
Id. (citation omitted).
98. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st
Cir. 1988).
99. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.
100. See id. at 639.
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turpitude within five years of his admission to the United States. 10' The
judge rejected Lozada's application for a discretionary waiver of his
deportation under former Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act ("INA"). °2 The judge also rejected Lozada's request for vol-
untary departure after determining that he was statutorily ineligible for
this limited benefit because of the same conviction. 10 3 Lozada filed a
timely notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals and
asserted that he would file a subsequent legal brief."0 4 Lozada failed to
file any such brief and his appeal was denied for having "had in no
meaningful manner identified the claimed error in the immigration
judge's comprehensive decision."' 1 5 He subsequently sought to reopen
his deportation proceedings by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
in that his counsel had failed to file a brief or statement explaining the
basis for appeal on his behalf.'0 6
The board held that "[a]ny right a respondent in deportation pro-
ceedings may have to counsel is grounded in the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee of due process," but "[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a
deportation proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding
was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasona-
bly presenting his case."' 07 Therefore to prevail in a motion to reopen,
an alien must show not just ineffective assistance of counsel, but assis-
tance that was so ineffective that it impinged upon the fundamental fair-
ness of the hearing in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. The board held, "[o]ne must show, moreover, that he was
prejudiced by his representative's performance." 108
The board expressed concern for efficiency and also sought to
avoid the possibility that an alien respondent could, by missing an
appointed briefing deadline, "circumvent at will the appeals process,
with its regulatory time restraints," and then proceed at his or her later
101. See id. at 637-38, 640 (explaining how Lozada was convicted of obtaining money under
false pretenses).
102. See id. at 640. Former Section 212(c) was repealed by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, but it remains
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.3 (2008). In its most common form, it requires that an applicant
establish eligibility by having been a legal resident in the United States for seven years, having
pleaded guilty to a ground for removal prior to April 24, 1996, and not having served more than a
five-year sentence for the deportable offense. Id. § 212.3 (f)(2), (f)(4), (g).
103. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 640.
104. Id. at 638.
105. Id.; see also Matter of Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. 354, 355 (B.I.A. 1986) (holding that
failure to specify reasons for an appeal is grounds for summary dismissal under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)).
106. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Mohsseni Behbahani v. INS, 796 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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convenience by "then claiming ineffective assistance of counsel."1 °9
The board's concern for efficiency also led it to pronounce a procedure
for properly advancing a claim of ineffective assistance. Under the new
standard:
A motion based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
should be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved
respondent attesting to the relevant facts. In the case before us, that
affidavit should include a statement that sets forth in detail the agree-
ment that was entered into with former counsel with respect to the
actions to be taken on appeal and what counsel did or did not
represent to the respondent in this regard. Furthermore, before alle-
gations of ineffective assistance of former counsel are presented to
the Board, former counsel must be informed of the allegations and
allowed the opportunity to respond. Any subsequent response from
counsel, or report of counsel's failure or refusal to respond, should be
submitted with the motion. Finally, if it is asserted that prior coun-
sel's handling of the case involved a violation of ethical or legal
responsibilities, the motion should reflect whether a complaint has
been filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities regarding such
representation, and if not, why not.1" 0
The board determined that these procedural requirements were nec-
essary for efficiency, accuracy of adjudications, and to curb any poten-
tial for abuse, given the substantial number of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel that come before it. Lozada' s claim was denied for
failure to comply with any of these requirements. 1 '
The safeguards of Lozada contrast with the de novo review that the
board was previously forced to undertake based on the record before
it. 12 Additionally, under Lozada, respondents have notice that they
must establish prejudice in the underlying proceeding that resulted from
109. Id. at 639; see also Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). Anin held
that an ineffective-assistance claim was appropriately denied where the applicant filed a motion to
reopen a case based on his exceptional circumstances almost two years after an in absentia
deportation order was issued even when the attorney had not advised the client of the hearing date
(only the attorney-not the client-received notice of the hearing). The court noted that filing
deadlines are necessarily arbitrary and harsh and apply even if the client is without fault.
110. Id.
11l. Id. at 639-40.
112. See Matter of Matelot 18 1. & N. Dec. 334, 336 (B.I.A. 1982). Appealing the denial of his
asylum application, the Haitian applicant in Matelot alleged that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his present counsel was not
competent to handle [his] case, having no prior experience in immigration law.
After reviewing the proceedings and the brief on appeal, we are unpersuaded that
the applicant has sustained his burden of establishing that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.
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the ineffective representation. In Lozada's case, the board found that he
had, in fact,
received a full and fair hearing at which he was given every opportu-
nity to present his case .... The immigration judge considered and
properly evaluated all the evidence presented, and his conclusions
that [Lozada] did not merit a grant of... relief as a matter of discre-
tion ... are supported by the record." 3
In other words, Lozada could not show that, had he filed a proper
appellate brief, there was any significant error in the underlying deci-
sion. Therefore, he could not claim any meaningful denial of his due
process rights simply because his direct appeal was summarily dis-
missed, as the appeal itself was unlikely to prevail. Thus, the board
found no prejudice in any alleged failing by Lozada's appellate counsel.
B. Evolution of Lozada: Subsequent Cases from the Board
of Immigration Appeals
The Lozada procedure and prejudice requirements have been fur-
ther elucidated in subsequent cases. In In re Grijalva, the board issued a
decision addressing the potential culpability of attorneys in cases where
the respondent was ordered deported in absentia.114 Grijalva concerned
a respondent who had been a permanent resident for approximately
thirty years at the time that he missed his court appearance. He was
deportable for a controlled-substance violation but was eligible and had
applied for relief from deportation.
11 5
Grijalva alleged that "his failure to appear [at his hearing] was due
to the misdirection of his counsel, who was unable to attend the hear-
ing." '116 When Grijalva filed to reopen his case before the immigration
judge, his motion was denied in part because the court believed that his
"counsel had engaged in tactics of delay which could only be character-
ized as contumacious."' 17 Grijalva appealed the denial of his motion to
reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel:
According to the respondent, on the morning of the scheduled hear-
ing, an employee of his prior attorney called to inform him that there
had been a continuance and that he should not appear at the Inmigra-
tion Court. The respondent later learned that the hearing had been
conducted in absentia, that his application for relief had been deemed
abandoned, and that he had been ordered deported. In support of his
113. Matter of Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 640.
114. 21 1. & N. Dec. 472 (B.I.A. 1996).
115. See id. at 472, 474.
116. Id. at 473.
117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Contumacious" is defined as "stubbornly
disobedient." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 272 (11 th ed. 2003).
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appeal, the respondent has submitted evidence that he filed a com-
plaint against his former counsel with the State Bar of Arizona, and
that he informed counsel of the allegations made against him. The
respondent also has included an affidavit from his former counsel
which corroborates the respondent's account of events." 8
Upon review of the record, the board found that the respondent had
established ineffective assistance by his former counsel. The board fur-
ther found that he had complied with the three steps as required in
Lozada in providing a detailed complaint to his prior counsel, allowing
counsel to respond, and subsequently filing his complaint with the disci-
plinary arm of his counsel's bar. 19
The board concluded:
[T]he respondent has made a convincing claim of ineffective assis-
tance by his former counsel.
Furthermore, the level of incompetence involved in this case estab-
lishes that the respondent's absence was the result of exceptional cir-
cumstances within the meaning of section 242B(f)(2) of the Act....
[T]he respondent, who had no reason not to rely on his counsel at this
juncture, was blatantly misled regarding his need to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Counsel's inappropriate behavior was recognized
by the Immigration Judge in his decision. We consider also that the
respondent is a longtime resident of the United States who had a
pending application for relief before the Immigration Judge. This
suggests that he would have appeared but for the misrepresentations
by his former counsel. 120
In an analogous case, In re Rivera-Claros, the motion to reopen
was denied where the failure to appear at a hearing was attributed to a
breakdown in attorney-client communication, but the respondent was
unwilling to file a complaint with the attorney's bar association.' 2 ' The
board further commented on the complaint-filing requirement with the
impugned attorney's governing bar association as established by
Lozada, noting that this requirement "serves to protect against collusion
between alien and counsel in which 'ineffective' assistance is tolerated,
and goes unchallenged by an alien before disciplinary authorities,
because it results in a benefit to the alien in that delay can be a desired
end, in itself, in immigration proceedings."'
' 22
The board reviewed the procedural history of the deportation hear-
ing and expressed distrust of the respondent's motives. The respondent,
118. In re Grijalva, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 473.
119. See id. at 474.
120. Id.
121. 21 1. & N. Dec. 599, 600-01 (B.I.A. 1996).
122. Id. at 604.
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Rivera-Claros, had changed venue and the impugned counsel was to
represent her at the new immigration court. 123 The attorney never filed
to withdraw his appearance with the court, but failed to appear at the
hearing after allegedly attempting to notify the respondent that he would
not be appearing at the hearing on the respondent's behalf due to his
heavy caseload. 24 Notice of the hearing had been properly served on
counsel of record, who failed to notify the respondent of the date and
their inability to represent the respondent. 25 Despite this failure of
communication and the resulting order of deportation against the respon-
dent, she still was unwilling to file a complaint against counsel.
26
The board acknowledged that client communication is an essential
element of competent representation and thus is a basis for a complaint,
but reasserted that efficiency mandates filing a bar complaint or ade-
quately explaining the reasons for failure to file so that the board is not
the sole reviewer of attorney conduct:
The governing regulations allow any attorney who is a member in
good standing of the bar of the highest court of any State, possession,
territory, Commonwealth, or the District of Columbia to practice
before Immigration Judges and the Board. Regulations do exist for
the disciplining of attorneys appearing before Immigration Judges.
But those regulations, in their current form, are not intended to be a
comprehensive set of rules governing the practice of law in the imimi-
gration field and, indeed, are not as broad as the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1995), for example.
Moreover, there is no expeditious way for this Board to deal with the
more routine attorney-related problems that periodically arise.
Instead, for attorneys who may practice before us simply by virtue of
their admission into a state bar or the bar of another recognized juris-
diction, we rely on the disciplinary process of the relevant jurisdic-
tion's bar as the first, and ordinarily the fastest, means of identifying
and correcting possible misconduct.
In this way, this Board's interest in having a method of monitoring
those attorneys who practice before us is addressed. However
owever [sic], this process, as set out in Matter of Lozada .... also
necessitates the cooperation of the party alleging ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. As we stated in Matter of Lozada, this process not
only serves to deter meritless claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel but also highlights the standards which should be expected of
attorneys who represent aliens in immigration proceedings. 127
123. Id. at 599-600.
124. Id. at 600-01.
125. See id. at 599-600.
126. See id. at 602.
127. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
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The board found that filing of a bar complaint serves several purposes:
First, it increases our confidence in the validity of the particular
claim. Second, it reduces the likelihood that an evidentiary hearing
will be needed. Third, it serves our long-term interests in policing the
immigration bar. And, fourth the requirement of filing a complaint,
or adequately explaining why such a complaint has not been filed,
protects against possible collusion between counsel and the alien cli-
ent. Moreover, we consider the filing of such a complaint, or reason-
ably explaining why such was not done, to be a relatively small
inconvenience for an alien who asks that he or she be given a new
hearing in a system that is already stretched in terms of its adjudica-
tory resources. '28
The majority in Rivera-Claros, while overtly concerned with the possi-
bility of collusion to stall the immigration-court process, disregarded the
objective fact that the respondent did not achieve lengthy delay in her
case. In fact, she had complied with the strict time limitations for filing
to reopen an immigration case conducted in absentia within 180 days of
the entry of an order against her.' 2 9 Any delay in her proceedings would
have had minimal advantage in terms of extending her stay in the United
States. 130
The dissenting view questioned "the wisdom and the fairness of
making the respondent in this case bear the major brunt of enforcing
professional practice standards before EOIR," particularly given that the
attorney had provided an affidavit describing that "[t]he breakdown in
attorney-client communications ... was on the side of the attorney."
1 3'
Unfortunately for Rivera-Claros, the majority found that her failure to
fully comply with Lozada by not filing a bar complaint was sufficient
cause to deny her motion to reopen.
In contrast to Rivera-Claros, nearly identical facts did constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel in the case of In re N-K- & V-S-. 132 But
N-K- & V-S- is distinguishable in that the respondents perfected their
Lozada motion, including filing a complaint with their counsel's bar
association, even though, like the respondent in Rivera-Claros, their
harm only extended to a failure of their attorney to properly notify them
of their hearing date. 133 The board found that "the record supports their
128. Id. at 605.
129. See id. at 607 n.5.
130. One potential advantage might be her ability to be employed under a continued work-
authorization card, but even this benefit was terminated with the order of removal.
131. Id. at 609 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting).
132. 21 1. & N. Dec. 879, 879-81 (B.I.A. 1997).
133. See id. at 881. The board went on to explain:
The applicants in this case have met the "high standard" we announced in Lozada.
First, the female applicant provided a detailed declaration supporting her claim of
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contention that they were prejudiced by the actions of their former coun-
sel and were prevented from presenting their case." '134
The board again addressed the conduct of an attorney who missed
an appellate deadline in the case of In re Assaad.t35 Mr. Assaad had
acquired temporary residency through his marriage to a U.S. citizen but
was placed in removal proceedings and sought to have the conditions
eliminated so that he could become a permanent resident. The board
found that his trial counsel had performed competently, but his second
attorney failed to file his appeal on time, resulting in its dismissal.
Assaad's case before the immigration court went poorly, as the judge
found that "limited evidence was submitted to assess the qualifying mar-
riage and that the respondent knew little about his wife."
' 13 6
Assaad's appellate attorney filed his appeal one week late, and it
was dismissed for being untimely.1 37  The attorney never informed
Assaad of the dismissal of the appeal. Assaad later filed a properly
developed Lozada motion alleging ineffective assistance of his appellate
counsel. Included in his motion and supporting materials was "a letter
from the State Bar of Texas to his current counsel, stating that the Inves-
tigatory Panel of the District Grievance Committee determined, based on
the respondent's complaint, that there was just cause to believe that for-
mer counsel committed professional misconduct."' 38 However, even
with discipline imposed upon counsel, the Board of Immigration
Appeals found that Assaad was not prejudiced because "ineffective
ineffective assistance of counsel. This declaration states that the applicants never
received notice of the hearing from former counsel or anyone else. It also states
their understanding that the attorney was retained for the limited purpose of
arranging their release from custody and that there was no agreement that he would
represent them at any future proceeding.
Second, prior counsel was informed by letter of the allegations against him, and his
reply indicates that he believed that his role as attorney was "limited to handling the
exclusion matter up to the release from INS custody, and did not extend to asylum
or any other subsequent work." Finally, the record reflects that the female applicant
filed a complaint against former counsel with the State Bar of California.
Id. (citations omitted). The board went on:
The attorney's stated belief that he only represented the applicants for a certain
phase of their case does not explain why he appeared at their hearing without them
and presented himself as their representative. Nor does it reflect an understanding
of the well-settled principle that there is no "limited" appearance of counsel in an
immigration proceeding. However, it does support a finding that the assistance the
applicants received from him was ineffective.
Id. at 881 n.2 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 881.
135. 23 I & N. Dec. 553, 554 (B.I.A. 2003).
136. Id. at 555.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 556.
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assistance of counsel is a denial of due process only if the proceedings
were so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasona-
bly presenting his or her case."' 3 9
Assaad argued that the failure of his counsel to file a brief denied
him the chance for meaningful appellate review of his case, which was
necessarily prejudicial.' 4 ° But the board found the following:
[R]eview of the record indicates that the respondent received a fair
and complete hearing before the Immigration Judge. He was well
represented by counsel throughout the hearing before the Immigra-
tion Judge and was provided every opportunity to present his case for
a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B) of the Act. In a careful decision,
the Immigration Judge determined that the respondent had failed to
meet his burden of showing that he had contracted a valid marriage,
which is necessary for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(B). In addi-
tion, the respondent has made no showing in his motion alleging inef-
fective assistance of counsel that he is eligible for any relief from
removal, or that there was error in the Immigration Judge's decision.
Accordingly, we find that the respondent has not shown that he was
prejudiced from prior counsel's conduct, and we will dismiss the
appeal. 141
Thus, with the line of cases culminating in Assaad, the board established
a two-part process for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in immigration matters. First, respondents must comply with
Lozada by providing counsel with notice and filing a bar complaint.
Second, respondents must allege and prove significant prejudice-that
there is a reasonable possibility that the ineffective representation vio-
lated their due-process rights of reasonably presenting their cases.
Assaad demonstrates the complexity of the matters, where he seems to
have had two, possibly three, ineffective attorneys. His third attorney
failed to properly allege prejudice, so they lost the Lozada motion
against appellate counsel. Appellate counsel was per se ineffective for
depriving Assaad of his appeal and was disciplined for this action. His
first attorney may or may not have been effective, but was unsuccessful
at building a trial record that convinced a judge of the bona fides of
Assaad's marriage. Then again, the judge, despite making a "careful
decision" may have been in error. The case, even in hindsight, presents
such uncertainty that one must question if his case represented due pro-
cess, despite the involvement of three attorneys.
42
139. Id. at 558.
140. See id at 561.
141. Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
142. Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland also touched on this point about due process:
"Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously
advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the defendant does not receive meaningful
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V. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT INEFFECTIVE CASES BEFORE DAKANE
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, along with the
other federal circuits, has seen a dramatic rise in immigration litigation
in recent years.' 4 3 As a result, the court has a well-developed record of
its application of the standards of effectiveness and prejudice. The cir-
cuit's view regarding prejudice was pronounced in Mejia Rodriguez v.
Reno, which was adjudicated under the court's highly deferential stan-
dard of review in which the court will only reverse a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals if it finds that the board has abused its
discretion in denying the motion to reopen.' 44
Mejia Rodriguez was an alien who sought to reopen his immigra-
tion proceedings so that he might apply for suspension of deportation. 145
Suspension of deportation was a discretionary form of relief that was
available to certain alien respondents if they could demonstrate (1) pres-
ence in the United States for ten years; (2) good moral character; and (3)
that their removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hard-
ship to themselves or their spouse, parent, or child if these relatives were
U.S. citizens.' 46 Mejia Rodriguez was ineligible for suspension of
deportation because he was convicted of a crime involving a controlled
substance. This conviction, although sealed by the state criminal court,
was a bar to showing the requisite good moral character for suspension
of deportation. He initially appealed the issue of his statutory eligibility
to the BIA but lost this appeal in 1994. He subsequently unsuccessfully
sought to reopen his deportation proceedings in 1997 after being taken
into immigration custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
for his imminent deportation. The motion was denied as untimely. 1
47
In his motion to reopen, Mejia Rodriguez alleged that he had
received ineffective representation by his counsel in immigration pro-
assistance in meeting the forces of the State does not, in my opinion, constitute due process."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Final Grant Guidelines for 2008, 72 Fed. Reg. 68,619, 68,621 (Dec. 5, 2007).
144. 178 F.3d 1139, 1145 (11th Cir. 1999).
145. See id. at 1141. Mejia Rodriguez had been subject to removal proceedings from 1990 to
1994, when his order of deportation became final. See id. at 1140-41. He entered the United
States in 1980, overstayed his student visa, and in 1986 pleaded no contest to one count of
trafficking in cocaine. See id. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced him as a youthful
offender. See id. at 1141. The trial court and his criminal counsel wrongly advised him that his
conviction would not trigger any adverse immigration consequences. See id. In 1997 he
successfully sought to reopen the criminal case by demonstrating that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel in the criminal matter because of the erroneous advice regarding the
consequences of his plea. See id. at 1142. The trial court vacated the conviction and the State
Attorney's office elected not to prosecute the case. See id. at 1142-43. As a result, Mejia has no
criminal history.
146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1994) (repealed in 1996).
147. See Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1142-43.
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ceedings. 48 His immigration defense counsel had also represented him
in his criminal matters and had erroneously advised him of the immigra-
tion consequences of his plea and conviction.' 49 By proving their
wrongful advice, he had successfully vacated and reversed the criminal
conviction, asserting that he had been denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. 50 Additionally, as a collateral conse-
quence of their wrongful advice in his criminal matters, he had been
barred from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal before
the immigration court.' 5 ' The court found the following:
Mejia's ineffective-assistance contentions necessarily focus on only
his argument that, except for the cocaine conviction, he would have
been eligible for suspension of deportation. As suspension of depor-
tation is an extraordinary remedy over which the Attorney General
possesses broad discretion, Mejia does not, and cannot, argue that he
would have received suspension, and thus would not be facing depor-
tation, if he had received effective assistance from his counsel during
his initial deportation proceedings.'
52
Thus, the issue becomes whether deficient representation by counsel in
deportation proceedings that renders an alien ineligible for suspension of
deportation inflicts a constitutional injury.
Under Mejia Rodriguez,
to establish the ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a
deportation hearing, an alien must establish that his or her counsel's
performance was deficient to the point that it impinged the "funda-
mental fairness" of the hearing .... [T]o establish the lack of funda-
mental fairness in a deportation proceeding, the alien must establish
deficient representation and "prejudice" or "substantial prejudice"
arising from this deficient representation.1
53
However, the court found that there is no "liberty interest" implicated in
the quest for discretionary relief, since such relief is an "act of grace"
rather than an entitlement. 54  Consequently, under the court's logic
148. See id at 1143.
149. See id. at 1146-47 & n.6.
150. See id. at 1142.
151. See id. at 1148.
152. Id. at 1146 (emphasis added).
153. Id. (citation omitted).
154. See id. at 1147. The court went on:
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the analogy between suspension of
deportation and an executive pardon by stating:
We have described the Attorney General's suspension of deportation under a related
and similarly phrased provision of the INA as "'an act of grace"' which is accorded
pursuant to her "unfettered discretion" and have quoted approvingly Judge Learned
Hand's likening of that provision to "'a judge's power to suspend the execution of a
sentence, or the President's to pardon a convict."'
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there is no "prejudice" if counsel's actions "merely" cause an applicant's
ineligibility to apply for the relief. 55
Interestingly, the court never mentioned Matter of Lozada by name
even though Lozada was the controlling agency precedent since 1988.
However, the court did reference the prejudice required after a showing
of ineffective assistance:
[A]n alien must make a prima facie showing of eligibility for waiver
of deportation and demonstrate a "strong showing" in support of the
application for discretionary relief. Similarly, . . . the alien must
establish "substantial prejudice" arising from the deficient perform-
ance, which requires that the alien make a prima facie showing of
eligibility and demonstrate that he or she would receive the relief
sought.
In this case, to be eligible for suspension, Mejia would have had to
demonstrate "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" if he is
returned to Honduras. Mejia has not made a "strong showing" of an
"exceptional ... hardship" and thus has not shown "prejudice"-let
alone "substantial prejudice"-arising from his attorneys' deficient
performance.
In this case, assuming Mejia's representation during his initial depor-
tation proceedings was deficient, this deficient representation did not
deprive Mejia of due process. The only consequence of his counsel's
deficient representation that Mejia alleges is that he is ineligible for
suspension. As mentioned above, Mejia does not, and cannot, estab-
lish that, but for his counsel's deficient representation, he would not
have been ordered deported. Moreover, Mejia has not even made a
strong showing that he would have been able to demonstrate an
extreme hardship arising from his return to Honduras. Therefore,
Mejia has not demonstrated that the alleged ineffectiveness of his
counsel caused any actual "prejudice" or "substantial prejudice",
because Mejia has not, and could not, argue that he would have
received the extraordinary relief of suspension were it not for his
counsel's deficient performance. 1
56
The irony is that the decisions of Mejia Rodriguez's counsel had barred
the client from applying for the relief, because counsel's own ineffec-
tive, faulty advice had rendered Mejia Rodriguez statutorily ineligible
for the waiver he sought from the immigration judge. 57 Because he was
ruled ineligible, his application was pretermitted and Mejia was denied
the opportunity to develop a record of the hardship he would face if
deported. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit based its decision of a finding of
Id. (quoting INS v. Yeuh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 29 (1996)).
155. See id. at 1148.
156. Id. at 1148-49 & n.8 (citation omitted).
157. See id. at 1147-48.
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no "prejudice" on the absence of proof of any potential hardship in the
inadequately developed record, despite the fact that this empty record
was the work and result of the ineffective attorneys. 1
58
VI. DAKANE
The current Eleventh Circuit case most commonly cited regarding
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is Dakane v. U.S. Attorney
General.'59 Dakane was an asylum applicant who claimed to have been
from Somalia, but had attempted to enter the United States using his
valid Kenyan passport.16 The immigration judge denied his application
for asylum after having determined that Dakane's testimony was not
credible regarding both his asserted claim of Somali nationality and his
claim of past persecution in Somalia. 6 ' The court further found that,
even if Dakane had been from Somalia, the record showed that he had
resettled in Kenya and therefore was ineligible for asylum in the United
States. 162
The immigration judge ordered removal, and Dakane appealed the
ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals. After the BIA granted
Dakane's counsel multiple extensions of time, the attorney failed to ever
file a brief, and the BIA ordered removal. Through new counsel,
Dakane asserted a Lozada claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
because of his former counsel's failure to comply with the briefing dead-
line, thus depriving Dakane of any right to appeal the denial of his asy-
lum application.1
63
In Dakane, the court made a straight-forward application of Lozada
and determined that despite substantial compliance with the attorney-
complaint process mandated by Lozada, the Eleventh Circuit was, in this
and future cases, requiring that a petitioner demonstrate that the ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel prejudiced the removal proceedings.1
64
158. See id. at 1148-49.
159. 399 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2005).
160. Id. at 1271.
161. See id. at 1271-72.
162. See id. The court quotes 8 C.F.R § 208.15 (2008):
An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States,
he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an
offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent
resettlement ....
Id. at 1271 n.l.
163. See id. at 1272.
164. See id. at 1274.
This Court has previously determined that the BIA may require aliens to satisfy the
three part Lozada test. However, it is not disputed by the parties that Dakane
substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Lozada. The issue here
is whether we should agree with the BIA's further requirement in Lozada that an
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Dakane referenced the right to effective representation:
It is well established in this Circuit that an alien in civil deportation
proceedings, while not entitled to a Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, has the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause right to a fundamentally fair hearing to effective
assistance of counsel where counsel has been obtained. In order to
establish the ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a
deportation hearing, an alien must establish that his or her counsel's
performance was deficient to the point that it impinged upon the fun-
damental fairness of the hearing such that the alien was unable to
reasonably present his or her case.165
Just as in Lozada, Dakane's sole claim of prejudice was in the failure of
his counsel to file an appeal.
166
Prejudice exists when the performance of counsel is so inadequate
that there is a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's error,
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Where
counsel fails to file any appeals brief in the context of an immigration
proceeding, effectively depriving an alien of an appellate proceeding
entirely, there is a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.167
However, Dakane had failed to conclusively show that the attorney's
error negatively affected the outcome of the case.'
68
Dakane failed because the trial record rebutted the presumption of
prejudice created by counsel's failure to file a brief. Dakane was
deemed not to be credible, and therefore he was ineligible to meet his
burden of proof as it pertained to past persecution. Without credible
testimony or any new evidence to support a different decision, Dakane
could not show how a lack of appeal had prejudiced him, as he could not
show that absent the error there was a "reasonable probability" that the
outcome would have been different. 169
VII. SURVEYING THE CASES FOLLOWING DAKANE
Since issuing its decision in Dakane on May 25, 2004, the Eleventh
Circuit has cited the case in almost one hundred subsequent decisions. 70
Of these, more than a dozen cases were petitions for review in which the
alien such as Dakane must also prove that his counsel's deficient representation
resulted in prejudice to him.
Id. (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 1273-74 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 1274.
167. Id. at 1274-75 (citations omitted).
168. See id. at 1275.
169. See id. at 1274.
170. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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court made rulings on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel., 7
Under the logic of Dakane, the court has never found both ineffective
assistance and prejudice. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has never reversed
the Board of Immigration Appeals on this issue. In each case the court
has found at least one of four reasons for dispensing with the case: (1)
failure to comply with Lozada, (2) failure to demonstrate prejudice, (3)
failure to show prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought, or
(4) failure to comply with any procedural element. Furthermore, none
of the cases have been published.
A. Cases Failing To Comply with Lozada
The Eleventh Circuit applied Dakane in Rama v. U.S. Attorney
General, which concerned an Albanian asylum applicant whose case
was denied after being deemed not credible.' 72 His attorney failed to
file a brief on his behalf when his case was on appeal with the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and as a result he was unable to challenge the
adverse credibility finding.' 73 Rama further failed to gather and submit
available documentary evidence to support his claim, and he provided
no supporting testimony of his family members, so he had failed to meet
171. As of March 6, 2008, there were twelve cases exactly. Again, this number is subject to
change by the time this article is published.
172. 147 F. App'x 905, 913 (11 th Cir. 2005).
173. See id. at 909-12. In more detail, the court went on to explain the reasons for its adverse-
credibility finding, listing the following:
(1) Rama testified that he received threatening phone calls at home, while he told
the INS inspector on his entry into the United States that he had no phone at home
in Albania; (2) Rama testified that these phone calls had included threats involving
his family, while he also testified that his family had left Albania by the time that
these calls were made; and (3) Rama testified that he worked in a brick factory,
while he told the INS inspector that he was a private driver and he included in his
asylum application that his only job during the previous five years had been selling
groceries.
Furthermore, the record reflects that, although Rama included in his asylum
application, and testified during the asylum hearing, that he received threatening
anonymous phone calls at home immediately before he left Albania in July 2001, he
informed the INS inspector on his arrival into the United States that he had no
phone in Albania. When Rama was asked to verify what location he meant by
"home," he stated "Elbasan L. Aqife Pasha, No. 42," which was the same home
address that he had listed in his asylum application and provided to the INS
inspector. Although Rama stated that this inconsistency was due to the fact that he
"didn't exactly understand" the interpreter during his interview with the INS
inspector because she spoke with a different Albanian dialect, the IJ reasonably
concluded that Rama's explanation was belied by his concession that the translator
accurately translated all of his other answers during this inspection. In addition,
although Rama testified that these phone calls included threats involving his family
members, he also testified that his mother, two brothers, and sister-in-law entered
the United States prior to his arrival in July 2001.
Id. at 912-13.
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his burden of proof. The BIA entered a summary affirmance of the deci-
sion of the immigration judge. 174
In cases where a single board member renders a summary affirm-
ance of an appeal, the circuit court must review the immigration judge's
decision, which is accepted by the BIA as the final order in the case.' 75
While legal issues are reviewed de novo, credibility determinations are
reviewed under the more deferential "substantial evidence" test. 17 6 In
Rama's case, he had not provided any factual, available evidence to help
buttress his testimony. He naturally failed to demonstrate that the evi-
dence, in the form of his inconsistent testimony, did not support the
lower court's adverse-credibility determination.
Rama argued that his attorney had been ineffective in not only fail-
ing to present documentary evidence but also neglecting to call family
members as witnesses even though some of his family members had
been granted asylum.'77 Unfortunately for Rama, he failed to comply
with the requirements of Lozada and Dakane. Rama failed to develop a
record that he had submitted an affidavit to the BIA, informed his coun-
sel of the allegations, or that he had filed a complaint with the Florida
bar.17 8 The court further found that even if Rama had complied with
Lozada, he would not have been able to demonstrate prejudice, as he had
not argued how any other evidence submitted would have possibly
changed the outcome of the proceedings. 1
79
Similarly, in a brief decision in Pitam v. U.S. Attorney General, the
Eleventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review for a Guyanese asylum
applicant who alleged that his trial counsel had committed ineffective
assistance only by failing to notify the client when he lost his appeal at
the BIA, thereby depriving him of his right to petition for appellate
review. 80 Pitam had filed, and the BIA denied, a motion to reopen,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because Pitam had failed to
comply with any of the Lozada requirements and made no further dem-
onstration of prejudice. 181
174. See id. at 907, 909.
175. Id. at 911
176. Id. ("[The court] must affirm the [IJ's] decision if it is supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.") (quoting Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (1lth Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See id. at 914-15.
178. Id. at 915.
179. See id. at 916.
180. 252 F. App'x 263, 263-64 & n.l (11th Cir. 2007).
181. See id. at 264.
The BIA denied the motion to reopen on September 8, 2006. It rejected the
ineffective assistance claim because Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for presenting such a claim as spelled out in Matter of Lozada.
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A more developed case is that of Hyacinthe v. U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral.18 2 Hyacinthe, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States in 2000
and pleaded guilty to three counts of bank fraud in 2003.183 He was
detained and removal proceedings ensued without the possibility of
bond as he was subject to mandatory detention under JINA § 236(c).
184
His attorney conceded that his crimes did not arise from a single scheme
of conduct, thus making him deportable for having committed multiple
crimes involving moral turpitude, but avoided a possible charge of hav-
ing been convicted of an "aggravated felony," which may have been the
case had the total loss occurred in one scheme. 185 Hyacinthe applied for
asylum but later withdrew the application after a detailed examination
by the judge ensuring that the withdrawal was voluntary and know-
ing.' 86 Hyacinthe then requested and received voluntary departure, a
limited privilege that avoided the entry of an order of deportation.
Despite his acquiescence to his departure:
On November 23, 2004, Hyacinthe filed a pro se notice of appeal
with the BIA, in which he contended that he had acquired "new evi-
dence" that [his attorney] Mr. Landy was "ineffective, malicious, and
[perhaps] even... psychologically unfit to practice law." Thereafter,
Hyacinthe filed a pro se "Motion to Invalidate Waiver of Appeal"
with the BIA, as well as a merits appeal brief arguing that his due
process rights had been violated. The essence of Hyacinthe's filings
before the BIA was that Mr. Landy conspired with the IJ to trick
Hyacinthe into withdrawing his asylum application, and that
Hyacinthe's underlying bank fraud convictions were part of a single
scheme, making deportation under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)
inappropriate. 1
87
The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision, "addressed Hyacinthe's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and concluded that Hyacinthe
failed to satisfy any of the requirements of Lozada."'88
Interestingly, Hyacinthe retained appellate counsel who filed a
Specifically, Petitioner failed to accompany his motion with a copy of his
representation agreement with his attorney, failed adequately to notify the attorney
of her alleged deficiencies, and failed to provide adequate proof that he had filed a
bar complaint against her.
Id. (citation omitted).
182. 215 F. App'x 856 (11 th Cir. 2007).
183. See id. at 858.
184. See id. at 859 n.3.
185. See id. at 858 (noting that an aggravated-felony charge would have statutorily barred
Hyacinthe from applying for asylum).
186. See id. at 859.
187. Id. (second alteration in original). In a footnote, the court also noted that "[o]n October
27, 2004, Hyacinthe filed a complaint against Mr. Landy with the police." Id. at 859 n.4.
188. Id. at 859-60.
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motion to reconsider on the issue of ineffective assistance. This counsel
neglected to guide Hyacinthe to properly comply with the requirements
of Lozada, so the motion to reconsider naturally failed, as did the peti-
tion for review with the Eleventh Circuit.18 9
The petitioners in Rama, Pitam, and Hyacinthe are linked in that
they were represented by counsel on appeal and before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and despite retaining attorneys, they were unable to comply with the
clearly defined prerequisites for successfully filing an ineffective-assis-
tance claim under Lozada and Dakane. This raises more troubling
issues regarding the possible ethical duties of appellate counsel. It
appears that in each case, the respondent was doomed for obvious and
avoidable technical issues, as counsel was obligated to comply with the
three-step Lozada process. It would appear that counsel in these three
matters had a duty to either: (1) comply with controlling precedent and
adequately represent the client, or (2) acknowledge that they were
advancing a claim with no legal merit and refrain from doing so.
Lozada itself was concerned that requiring substantial steps on the part
of an aggrieved respondent would prevent collusion with counsel and
prevent dilatory tactics, which the BIA perceived as having some advan-
tage for certain respondents. However, there is no possible nefarious
motive to filing a petition for review in the federal courts of appeal, as
review at this level does not provide any automatic stay of removal
while the case is pending. Additionally, as respondents must retain their
own private counsel for advancing their claims in the immigration con-
text, it is likely that the respondents in Rama, Pitam, and Hyacinthe each
compensated their appellate counsel for work that was fundamentally
flawed.
B. Cases Failing To Demonstrate Prejudice
The Eleventh Circuit has issued nine unpublished decisions apply-
ing Dakane where the central issue was whether the petitioner had
shown the requisite prejudice to justify a motion to reopen based on
ineffective assistance of counsel in the course of removal proceedings.
As mentioned above, the court has not yet found prejudice in any
case. 190
In Sales Luis v. U.S. Attorney General, the court addressed an asy-
lum case where, after numerous continuances, the respondent's attorney
failed to appear for the individual hearing. 91 The respondent proceeded
without counsel, and his case was denied:
189. See id. at 860-63.
190. See supra text accompanying note 8.
191. 152 F. App'x 864, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2005).
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[O]n June 24, 2003, Sales-Luis appeared without [his attorney,] Phil-
lips. Earlier that morning, the court had received an emergency
motion from Phillips, asking to continue the hearing because he suf-
fered from chronic sleep disorder, anxiety, and depression. The IJ
noted the letter from Phillips' doctor submitted in support of his
motion was dated June 11, 2003, and, consequently, denied Phillips'
motion as untimely. The IJ further stated that, according to Phillips'
motion, Phillips had suffered from his medical condition since child-
hood, but failed to bring this information to the court's attention in
the "close to a year and a half' he represented Petitioners. After the
IJ informed Sales-Luis that Phillips had filed a motion indicating he
could not represent Sales-Luis due to his health, Sales-Luis stated it
was "fine because that's what [Phillips had] been using in order to
cancel all his appointments with [Sales-Luis] and then saying that he
would see [Sales-Luis] in two or three months down the road."'
' 92
The respondent wished to be considered for voluntary departure, but was
ineligible for post-hearing voluntary departure because neither he nor his
minor child (who was also in removal proceedings) had requested this
relief at a master calendar hearing.1 93 Had the respondent wished to be
considered for pre-hearing voluntary departure, he would have had to
abandon his asylum claim. However, Sales Luis had not elected to do
so, likely in part because he made this decision without the assistance of
counsel, because his counsel had not appeared at the individual hearing.
The Eleventh Circuit did not address any efforts by Sales Luis to
comply with Lozada, but rather made its decision in reliance on Dakane,
based on the lack of any prejudice shown by Sales Luis:
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate what prejudice they suffered
on account of Phillips' ineffective assistance of counsel. Aside from
speculating as to how a competent attorney might have conducted
himself at the hearing, Petitioners fail to set forth how their proceed-
ings would have been different had their counsel been present,
including what, if any, additional (1) evidence would have been
presented, (2) testimony would have been offered, and (3) witnesses
would have testified. Moreover, Petitioners fail to explain how any
such evidence would have changed the outcome of the proceedings.
Consequently, Petitioners failed to establish their proceedings would
have differed but for their counsel's deficient performance. Their
ineffective assistance of counsel claim therefore fails ....
In Toska v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit made a
similar finding of lack of prejudice, but the trial counsel was not por-
192. Id. at 866-67 (third, fourth, and fifth alteration in original).
193. Id. at 869.
194. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
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trayed in any negative light.'95 Toska involved a family's application
for asylum that was denied because the lead respondent was deemed not
credible.' 96 Toska argued that "the BIA erred in denying her motion to
remand based on ineffective assistance of counsel because the IJ would
not have found her lacking in credibility if her attorney had familiarized
himself with the facts of her case and properly prepared her for her first
asylum hearing."'' 97 The court analyzed the case to determine if Toska
had shown "that counsel's performance was so deficient that it may have
affected the outcome of the proceedings," but found that "Toska did not
establish that her attorney's performance resulted in prejudice because
she failed to demonstrate that the IJ would have found her credible but
for her attorney's errors."
98
The petitioner in Wenas v. U.S. Attorney General challenged the
effectiveness of his attorney when the attorney failed to file corroborat-
ing documentation of country conditions demonstrating persecution of
Chinese Christians in his native Indonesia. 199 From the appeal, it
appears that Wenas had failed to provide documentation of claims of
past or future persecution in Indonesia, however the immigration judge
did consider:
the 2002 Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Prac-
tices for Indonesia and the 2003 Department of State International
Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia ("the Reports"), both of
which adequately conveyed Indonesia's history of religious violence
against Chinese Christians. The additional materials Wenas filed
with his motion to reopen predate the Reports and are largely genera-
lized accounts of religious violence in Indonesia. These additional
materials do not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different
outcome in Wenas's proceedings. Therefore, because the IJ ade-
quately considered Indonesia's history of religious violence, the BIA
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wenas's attorney's
failure to file supporting documentation did not prejudice Wenas.2°
Mora Lancheros v. U.S. Attorney General addressed alleged inef-
fectiveness of counsel at an individual hearing on the petitioner's appli-
cation for asylum based on her past persecution in Venezuela.20 Mora
Lancheros was found not credible because of "notable discrepancies
between Mora's written statement and testimony. 20 2 Her testimony
195. 194 F. App'x 767, 769 (11 th Cir. 2006).
196. See id. at 768-69.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 769.
199. 201 F. App'x 668, 669 (11th Cir. 2006).
200. Id. at 670-71 (emphasis added).
201. 236 F. App'x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2007).
202. Id. at 558. Mora failed to mention the following in her application:
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was much more detailed than her asylum application, leading the immi-
gration judge to conclude that Mora was embellishing her story.2 °3
[Mora claimed] that her counsel was ineffective for failing to prop-
erly examine her, investigate her claim, and present evidence to the IJ
that she had been stabbed with a screwdriver on January 31, 2003
during her encounter with the two Bolivarian Circle members. Mora
asserts that, had her counsel more fully investigated and developed
her claim, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of her
hearing would have been different. 2°
Mora never mentioned the stabbing in her testimony, and if she had, this
would have been an additional inconsistency with her asylum applica-
tion. However, in her motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, she attached medical documentation of the stab wound. One
may speculate that had this documentation been included in the record,
Mora's other "embellishments" may have been viewed more charitably
by the immigration judge.
The court ruled that Mora could not demonstrate that her counsel's
conduct prejudiced her case because she conceded that she had never
informed him of the stabbing in advance of the trial.2 5 Additionally,
despite her allegation that this was part of the claim that counsel failed
to discover through his lack of diligence, she asserted in her filings that
her counsel "did not violate his ethical or legal responsibilities. 2 °6
Effective client communication and diligence in developing the claim
would have been among these duties and responsibilities. Since he was
not accused of failing in his duties, the evidence of the stabbing could be
deemed reasonably available at the time of the hearing, thereby not con-
stituting "previously unavailable" evidence or evidence not submitted
through the failure of counsel.207
The four remaining cases are more discrete applications of the
prejudice standard. In Pavlova v. U.S. Attorney General, the petitioner
challenged a denial of a motion to reopen when, through counsel, she
had withdrawn her application for asylum and accepted voluntary depar-
(1) that she was approached and threatened by members of the Bolivarian Circles on
January 31, 2003; (2) that she had been collecting signatures to recall the
Venezuelan president and that the activity resulted in threats to her safety; and (3)
that she had received pamphlet threats warning her to stop her political activity.
Mora does not contest the BIA's findings that she omitted the above-mentioned




205. Id. at 561.
206. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 561-62.
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ture.2°8 Pavlova failed to comply with Lozada, but the BIA rejected her
motion for her failure to show prejudice. 20 9 The court found she had not
suffered any prejudice or "even suggest[ed] that she would not have
been ordered removed but for her counsel's alleged misrepresentation
[regarding the limited benefit of voluntary departure]. ' '2 1
Portillo-Sierra v. U.S. Attorney General rejected a Colombian asy-
lum seeker's ineffective-assistance claim because the petitioner raised
the claim for the first time before the Eleventh Circuit and therefore was
procedurally barred. 21' Additionally, the petitioner failed to show that
he was prejudiced by his attorney's unusual decision to bypass his direct
testimony, despite the immigration judge finding him not to be credible
because his story was contradicted by other evidence in the record.212
Diop v. U.S. Attorney General also rejected an argument that a Sen-
egalese asylum seeker was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's per-
formance, when the petitioner had lost his asylum case for failure to file
the application within the permitted one-year period after his arrival in
the United States.21 3 Among other reasons for losing in the Eleventh
Circuit, "Diop fail[ed] to establish that his appellate counsel's failure to
argue that the IJ erred in his assessment of Diop's alleged extraordinary
circumstances [for filing beyond the one-year deadline] was so deficient
that it may have affected the proceedings' outcome," '214 particularly
given that the record showed improving conditions in Senegal that the
petitioner also had not rebutted.21 5
Finally, in Chahin v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a claim of ineffective assistance where the respondent was
208. 242 F. App'x 656, 657 (11th Cir. 2007).
209. Id. at 660.
210. Id. Pavlova alleged that her former counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by
because counsel had failed to fully apprise her of the removal process, failed to sufficiently
prepare for the hearing, and provided incorrect information regarding voluntary departure. She
alleged that the benefit to her of voluntary departure was completely illusory since in her opinion
the suggestion that she could still secure a visa was "fatally flawed" because there was "virtually
no chance" she would receive another visa in light of her fraud in acquiring her current visa.
Additionally, Pavlova's motion did not state that her attorney had been informed of her allegations
and had been given an opportunity to respond, or that a complaint had been filed against him with
a disciplinary authority. Id. at 657-58.
211. 200 F. App'x 925, 928 (11th Cir. 2006).
212. Id. at 927-28.
213. 159 F. App'x 103, 104-05 (1 1th Cir. 2005) ("An alien may not apply for asylum unless
he demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within one
year of his arrival in the United States.") (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
§ 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000)). The primary dispute on Diop's direct appeal to
the BIA was whether the immigration judge erred in denying Diop an additional continuance to
seek counsel. Id. at 104. (Diop proceeded pro se.)
214. Id. at 105.
215. Id. at 106-07.
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deported in absentia, and his motion to reopen was denied. 2 , 6 Whereas
the record reflected that the respondent may have had a claim of
extraordinary circumstances to justify his absence from court, the peti-
tioner proceeded instead with a claim of ineffective assistance before the
Eleventh Circuit.21 7 The claim was based on the history of representa-
tion in which the attorney "always had provided [Chahin] with prior
notice of his immigration hearings, so he expected to hear from his attor-
ney regarding the hearing that he missed.' 2 18  However, because the
petitioner had moved, the attorney could not contact him.2 19 The court
did not address compliance with Lozada, but dismissed the case for a
failure to demonstrate prejudice.22 °
VIII. COMPARISON WITH SELECTED DECISIONS BY COURTS
IN OTHER CIRCUITS
The Eastern District of New York has incorporated the same stan-
dard and had occasion, in United States v. Manragh, to address the issue
of ineffective assistance in a case where the respondent's counsel failed
to file a brief on appeal. 221 The court held that this failure was mani-
festly ineffective, but could not find "prejudice" given Manragh's
absence of specificity as to what appellate counsel might have argued to
the BIA in an effort to overturn the immigration judge's determina-
tion.222 Manragh had originally sought discretionary relief under INA
§ 212(c) but was denied this relief in the exercise of discretion.223
216. 190 F. App'x 921, 922-23 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 922.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 923.
221. 428 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The case arose in federal district court
because Manragh was criminally charged with reentry after deportation. See id. at 132. His
defense relied in part on attacking the underlying removal order. See id.
222. See id. at 137-38.
223. Id. at 133. Discretionary relief such as 212(c) requires an immigration judge to
balance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent
resident with the social and humane considerations presented in his behalf to
determine whether the granting of section 212(c) relief appear[ed to be] in the best
interests of this country. Adverse factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances
of the exclusion ground at issue; (2) other immigration law violations; (3) the alien's
criminal record; and (4) evidence indicative of an alien's undesirability as a
permanent resident. Favorable factors include: (1) family ties to the United States;
(2) many years of residency in the United States; (3) hardship to the alien and his
family upon deportation; (4) United States military service; (5) employment history;
(6) community service; (7) property or business ties; (8) evidence attesting to good
character; and, in the case of a convicted criminal, (9) proof of genuine
rehabilitation.
Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Scott, 394 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2005)) (alterations in
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Manragh's "extensive criminal record compiled over a relatively short
period of time" could not be overcome by his family ties, health
problems, and employment history, given that the history was sporadic
and interrupted by periods of incarceration.224
The district court found that Manragh's unfavorable criminal his-
tory and other negative factors left appellate counsel with "scant, if any,
ammunition" to fashion a viable position for the Board of Immigration
Appeal's consideration-despite Manragh's contention that his immi-
gration counsel failed to properly present the full spectrum of his medi-
cal problems and their impact on his capacity to work.225 Manragh
ultimately could not demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability
224. See id. at 137-38. The court described his criminal record and immigration history as
follows:
In 1979, defendant pled guilty to Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in
the Fourth Degree .... He was sentenced to a conditional discharge and a $600
fine.
A year and a half later, i.e. in November of 1980, defendant was charged with
Assault in the First Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second
Degree .... Those charges arose from an incident during which defendant shot
another person who, according to defendant, had attempted to steal his marijuana
after he offered to sell that person and his companion "a couple of bags." After bail
was apparently posted by his mother, defendant failed to appear for a scheduled
court date on December 9, 1980. As a result, another State charge was leveled
against defendant, Bail Jumping in the First Degree ....
... [D]efendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
of 3 1/3 to 10 years incarceration on the convictions for assault and weapons
possession, and 1 1/3 to 4 years on the Bail Jumping in the Second Degree
conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. Defendant was released from jail
on May 27, 1988.
A warrant of deportation was issued on January 24, 1991. In approximately
March 1991, [defendant] was removed from the United States to Jamaica.
At some point between March 1991 and August 1992, defendant illegally
returned to the United States and was thereafter charged by a Suffolk County New
York grand jury with three felony counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled
Substance in the Third Degree and three felony counts of Criminal Sale of a
Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. On August 5, 1993, defendant entered a
guilty plea to one count of Attempted Criminal Sale of a Controlled substance in the
Third Degree, a class C Felony and on November 24, 1993, was sentenced as a
second felony offender to serve four to eight years in prison. Defendant served his
state prison sentence on that conviction and on or about March 21, 1997, was again
removed to Jamaica.
Between March 27, 1997 and 2003, defendant again returned illegally to the
United States. On or about June 10, 2003, defendant was found in the custody of
the Suffolk County New York Sheriff at the Suffolk County jail awaiting trial on a
felony charge of Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Second Degree.
Id. at 132-34 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. at 138.
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that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
226
United States v. Scott is a primary controlling Second Circuit case
on the subject.227 It is interesting because the court did find prejudice-
this time in the case of a resident who, like Manragh, was eligible for a
discretionary waiver of removal under former INA §212(c).228 The
prejudice attached when Scott's counsel failed to file the necessary
application for Scott, despite instruction to do so by the immigration
judge. The attorney then failed to notify Scott of a hearing date and did
not appear himself, resulting in Scott being ordered deported in absentia
and abandoning his claim for relief from removal.2 29 The Second Cir-
cuit found that this performance was ineffective and that prejudice could
be shown, since Scott could show a reasonable possibility that he could
have prevailed in his hearing, resulting in a different outcome but for his
attorney's failings:
Several factors would have weighed in favor of granting
§ 212(c) relief to Scott in 1996-fifteen years of residence in New
York, strong family ties to New York, young age of lawful arrival in
United States, and employment and education in New York. Accord-
ing to Scott, his mother would also have testified that he is a "good
father and a good husband," a "nice caring person" who is "willing to
help and very considerate," and that he was physically abused as a
child.
... Scott makes a legitimate claim under any reasonable stan-
dard that he could have persuaded an IJ in 1996 that he was rehabili-
tated ....
... However, an alien's strong family ties to the United States in
addition to his extensive educational and employment histories in the
United States have, on occasion, been held to outweigh a single con-
viction of third degree drug possession, a crime more serious than
any of Scott's. Therefore, we are persuaded that Scott's multiple
convictions for lesser crimes would not have outweighed his strong
ties to the United States.
We also find noteworthy that, between 1989 and 1995, more
than one-half of the applications filed for § 212(c) relief were
granted.
Based on these factors, we conclude that Scott had a "reasonable
226. Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 2004)).
227. 394 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
228. Id. at 119.
229. Id. at 114.
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probability" of receiving § 212(c) relief in 1996. Thus, the failure of
Scott's counsel to seek § 212(c) relief was prejudicial and rendered
entry of the deportation order "fundamentally unfair" ....230
Thus, given that Scott had been completely barred from presenting his
case by his counsel's failings, he could show ineffectiveness. He also
built a record to show what facts he could have proven to earn a positive
exercise of discretion. Given this evidence and the very good odds for
success, he was able to show that he was prejudiced in that he reasona-
bly could have achieved a different outcome in his case.
Other circuits have shown a more flexible application of the
prejudice and Lozada requirements. The First Circuit has upheld appli-
cation of the Lozada requirements, so long as they are not applied arbi-
trarily, and it has even overturned the Board of Immigration Appeals for
rejecting a Lozada claim where the applicant initially failed to fully
comply with Lozada, but later perfected the complaint procedure.23'
The Ninth Circuit has also held that the Lozada requirements should not
be applied rigidly, such as when counsel has already been disciplined or
when the record is clear regarding ineffectiveness.232
230. Id. at 120-21 (citations omitted).
231. See Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001). Butsee Tai v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2005) (holding the BIA not obligated to inform applicant of Lozada defects and permit to cure
incomplete filing).
232. See Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing how multiple Lozada
motions may be permitted even when untimely); Granados-Oseguera v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 993,
998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that Lozada requirements are not sacrosanct, and noncompliance
is forgiven where counsel failed to file an appeal and failed to pursue available relief); Rodriguez-
Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2002).
In this case, we face multiple claims of ineffective assistance. Like a set of
nested Russian dolls, the case reveals one layer of allegedly incompetent
representation after another. Ray asserts that his first attorney, Jang Im, denied him
due process by failing to file his brief on appeal. Ray asserts that his second
attorney, Anthony Egbase, denied him due process by failing to file his first motion
to reopen in a timely fashion. Ray asserts that his third attorney, Martin Guajardo,
denied him due process by failing to contest the BIA's decision to deny his first
motion to reopen (or, for that matter, to do anything else).
We find that Ray has been denied due process because of the failure of his last
two attorneys, Mr. Egbase and Mr. Guajardo, to litigate his case in a timely fashion.
There is no question that these two attorneys have provided assistance so poor that
Ray has been "prevented from reasonably presenting his case." The former dallied
for several months before missing filing deadlines, neglecting filing requirements,
and ultimately costing Ray the opportunity to have his first motion to reopen heard
on the merits. The latter took from Ray $10,000 in fees, and the record indicates
that he provided no substantive legal assistance whatsoever; in doing nothing, he
condemned to failure Ray's second motion to reopen. Indeed, these attorneys have
prevented Ray not only from "reasonably presenting his case," but from presenting
his case at all. Their performance unquestionably constitutes ineffective assistance.




Litigants in the Eleventh Circuit are left to wonder what might con-
stitute prejudice and seek guidance in the unpublished decisions discuss-
ing what is not. One may deduce that the Eleventh Circuit is not
sympathetic to these types of cases, but the author suggests that the fail-
ings of the post-Dakane cases are not necessarily representative of any
sort of process failure. As discussed above, despite some clear instances
of ineffectiveness, the cases following Dakane all seem to share weak-
nesses. A common flaw was failing to exhaust administrative remedies
and properly preserve arguments for appeal by neglecting to fully com-
ply with Lozada before the Board of Immigration Appeals, since unlike
some other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has not explicitly excused the
Lozada complaint process.233 However, the primary issue in most cases
was failing to build a thorough record, in conjunction with the ineffec-
tive-assistance claim, to demonstrate that a court could have found a
reasonable possibility of a different outcome if the original claim was
properly litigated. In other words, if the applicant is going to embark on
"a second trial .. .of counsel's unsuccessful defense, ' 234 the applicant
must be prepared to fully document every possible aspect of the claim
that the original counsel had neglected to pursue.
An additional possible benefit of properly building the alternate
record of evidence in a Lozada or Dakane action is that the aggrieved
immigrant with a strong case may benefit from a motion to remand by
counsel from the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Liti-
gation ("OIL"). OIL is charged with defending the decisions of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") in Petitions for
Review with the U.S. courts of appeal. In cases where the petitioner
properly complied with Lozada, and especially when a complaint leads
to punishment by the former counsel's state bar, OIL attorneys are then
in the potentially difficult position where they must argue that the EOIR
decision was correct and that the disciplined counsels' actions were not
prejudicial. To a certain extent, in defending EOIR, OIL must argue that
disciplined counsel's defense was sufficient. When confronted with a
developed record demonstrating available evidence, witnesses and testi-
mony not discovered by negligent former counsel, OIL may be willing
233. See Esposito v. INS, 987 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Esposito did not file a complaint
with any disciplinary authority, but provided a reasonable explanation in his affidavit (a belief that
[his counsel] had already been suspended from the practice of law) for not doing so."); Castillo-
Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) ("While the requirements of Lozada are generally
reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully served by other
means."). The attorney in Castillo-Perez had failed to file applications by a court-appointment
deadline, thus causing applicant to abandon forms of relief.
234. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
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to agree to remand the case for further proceedings with EOIR, particu-
larly in the Eleventh Circuit, where there is no favorable decision in any
Lozada actions after Dakane and ostensibly, OIL's litigation position is
strengthened by the absence of any favorable case providing a scheme
for other post-Dakane claims.
When offered a chance at a motion to remand, the petitioning
immigrant has two choices: agree to the remand or proceed with the case
before the court of appeals. On principle, petitioners may wish to have
their day in court, including a court judgment on the issue of ineffective-
ness, but as a practical matter, the offer of remand, as initiated by the
attorneys charged with defending EOIR's judgment is generally an
attractive position that will be accepted by petitioners. Attorneys advis-
ing their clients may feel that the clients have a reasonable chance of
establishing favorable post-Dakane precedent, but ultimately, the cli-
ents' assurances of a second hearing, and likely a grant of relief from
removal, will prevail over any larger policy concerns of the attorneys.
Litigants for asylum in the Eleventh Circuit have additional con-
cerns caused by negative decisions such as Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral, which affirm a highly deferential standard of review to findings of
fact by immigration judges.235 Silva pertained to a Colombian asylum
seeker who had received a series of threats related to the political activi-
ties of Silva and her family.236 However, since persecution is an
"extreme concept," she could not show that the threats were persecu-
tion. 3 7 A few days after receiving threats, she was attacked while driv-
ing her car, but she could not identify her attackers, so the immigration
judge found that she had failed to distinguish that this act was persecu-
tion on account of her political opinion rather than a random act of vio-
lence.238 Despite the proximity of the incidents, the immigration judge's
decision was upheld by the Board of Immigration Appeals 9.23  The Elev-
enth Circuit also upheld the decision because of the deference owed to
the agency fact-finder:
This Court reviews administrative fact findings under the highly def-
235. 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11 th Cir. 2006).
236. Id. at 1233-34.
Although Silva first speculated that the FARC was responsible for the
shooting, Silva later admitted that she did not know who fired the shots or made the
phone call or why the shots were fired. Silva testified that the last time she
participated in politics was a few days before the October 9, 1999, shooting. Silva
testified that she had no further threats, calls, or other problems after October 9,
1999, until she came to the United States in November 1999.
Id. at 1234.
237. Id. at 1237 (citing Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)).
238. id. at 1242.
239. Id. at 1235.
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erential substantial evidence test. We must affirm the decision of the
Immigration Judge if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole. Thus, we do
not engage in a de novo review of factual findings by the Immigration
Judge.
Findings of fact made by . . . the [Immigration Judge] may be
reversed by this Court only when the record compels a reversal; the
mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not
enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings. We view
the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency's deci-
sion and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.
Under this highly deferential standard of review, we may not reweigh
the evidence from scratch.2 4 °
Silva, taken literally, would doom many, if not most, asylum cases
because applicants will not know the exact identity of their persecutors.
240. Id. at 1236 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The
dissent found these findings highly unsatisfactory:
The only reasonable conclusion from the facts established by Silva's
application statements and testimony, which were credited by the immigration
judge, is that the reason she was threatened, shot at, and threatened again is her
political activities. The evidence compels that conclusion. It is no answer to say to
Silva, as the immigration judge did, that "I don't see that you are in any worse
position than anybody else in that country." I doubt that all forty-three million
people in Colombia are being persecuted by FARC-the evidence establishes that at
least four of them, Silva's non-political brothers, are not. In any event, the
widespread nature of violence in a country is not a legitimate reason for denying
asylum to a petitioner who establishes that she has been persecuted within the
meaning of § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. There is no
numerosity exception in the asylum laws.
And indeed under the majority's decision, no one from Colombia will be
entitled to asylum. Since "[t]he majority of the violence in Colombia is not related
to protected activity," since the "awful is ordinary," and since only "four out of
every ten murders are on account of a protected ground," it will always be
reasonable to find that violence was not on account of a protected ground-even
where, as here, a terrorist group threatens a political activist with death because of
her politics, she receives a barrage of threatening phone calls connected in time to
that threat and to her political activities, and soon thereafter someone attempts to kill
her. This is not a good decision but there is, I suppose, a bright side. What the
Court holds today will make it easier to handle our caseload. In the future we can
simply stamp any petition for review of a Colombian's asylum denial: "Affirmed.
See the Silva decision."
Today's decision also has implications beyond cases involving Colombian
applicants. The majority opinion refers to the often-mentioned, but never sighted,
"rare case" in which the facts are so compelling that we will reverse an immigration
judge's finding that a petitioner has failed to prove persecution on a protected
ground. No published opinion of this Court has ever found that rare case, and
today's decision indicates that such a case, like the fabled unicorn, exists only in our
imagination.
Id. at 1248-49 (Carnes, C.J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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However, one must remember that it applies only to the standard of
review at the Eleventh Circuit, where deference will be given to the
agency decision 'unless the evidence compels an alternate outcome.
Silva is important in the context of claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel because it highlights the potential of failure in all appeals if the
applicant does not build a compelling trial record to support a grant of
asylum.
X. CONCLUSION
The author embarked on this project expecting to find that there
was possible injustice and neglect on the part of the Eleventh Circuit in
the context of ineffective-assistance cases and Lozada actions. Part of
this assumption was based on discouraging decisions such as Silva and
by the discovery that there were no favorable cases granting remand
subsequent to Dakane.
However, the ultimate conclusion must be that, within the Eleventh
Circuit, litigants must strictly comply with Lozada, because unlike other
circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has never explicitly excused noncompli-
ance. Furthermore, litigants bear a heavy burden of demonstrating
prejudice, even if their counsel commits obvious misconduct. Both the
immigrant and counsel must build a significant record that demonstrates
that they had a reasonable possibility of prevailing on the underlying
claim for relief, but for previous counsel's failure to perform as a rea-
sonable attorney would in representing the claim. This record must be
presented to the Board of Immigration Appeals in conjunction with
proof of the bar complaint, so that the final agency decision, even if
negative, is made inclusive of the immigrant's complete record docu-
menting how the attorney did harm.
It is remarkable that in so many cases, attorneys alleging ineffective
assistance are themselves ineffective and improperly file a Lozada
claim. It is further tragic that some litigants do not find adequate coun-
sel until after their agency proceedings are concluded, so they are pre-
cluded from building a proper Lozada claim and presenting evidence of
the resulting prejudice before litigating the matter before the U.S. courts
of appeals.
It is also interesting that, because of the prejudice requirement,
there is no direct correlation between victimization by attorney malprac-
tice and winning a second day in court. In the disciplinary cases cited
herein, it may be assumed that none prevailed in a decision at the Elev-
enth Circuit, since there is no positive case from the court. Perhaps
some of the victims were successful in actions with the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals or benefited from an OIL motion to remand but the
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implication is that some of the cases were not permitted to be relitigated
despite receiving such unprofessional representation that it led to sanc-
tion of the attorney.
As discussed above, Dakane itself illustrates a possible negative
result. The immigrant lost, in part, because he was deemed not credible,
and he never was able to directly challenge that credibility finding
because his attorney failed to file an appeal. The tremendous disparity
in asylum-grant rates by immigration judges permits skepticism into the
legitimacy of the original decision, but Dakane was denied any direct
review of his case, including the problematic credibility finding. The
Eleventh Circuit based its negative decision on his inability to show
prejudice because his lack of credibility was fatal to his asylum
application.
As discussed by Judges Katzmann and Bea, there is ample reason
for concern that immigrants fall victim to malpractice by attorneys and
nonattorneys. The misdeeds of counsel frequently involve a failure of
communication with clients, failure to investigate and understand cli-
ents' claims, and failure to prepare adequate testimony and supporting
documentary records. As documented above, in some instances, trial
counsel fail to meet with their clients at all, which means the lawyers
lack the familiarity with the case to elicit and rehabilitate testimony or
effectively argue factual and legal issues. This lack of diligence results
in a poor trial record that cannot provide the foundation for a reasonable
appeal.
Similar to the criminal context, it is very difficult to establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the prejudice require-
ment is so onerous and difficult to prove, given the fact that the trial
record being attacked is itself necessarily the product of the negligent
attorney. There is a degree of arbitrariness in the assessment of
prejudice as demonstrated by the different outcomes in Strickland and
Wiggins. Despite similarities in crimes, counsels' noncompliance with
professional norms and mitigating factors not presented in sentencing
hearings, in Wiggins the court thought one juror might be swayed, but in
Strickland the court decided that all twelve jurors would be indifferent.
I would argue that Justice Marshall was right in his Strickland dissent,
that given the "impediments to a fair evaluation of the [probable] ...
outcome of a trial ... affected by ineffectiveness of counsel, it seems to
me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to
have been incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice."'24 '
The life of the aggrieved immigrant clearly is prejudiced by the
241. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2008] 1113
1114 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1063
actions of negligent counsel. The problem for subsequent counsel is to
show that such immigrants are legally "prejudiced" to such an extent
that they may overcome the shortcomings of the initial attorney. Legal
problems are compounded at each stage of appeal, so it is imperative for
the bar to reach a higher level of effectiveness earlier in the appellate
stage and spare no effort to build a record of the harm done. Otherwise,
the prejudice will only be felt by the immigrant and never recognized
outside of their own view of disenfranchisement.
